Ninth Circuit Narrowly Vindicates First Amendment in Bellwether Compelled Speech Case

Featured Expert Contributor, First Amendment

By Megan Brown, a Partner with Wiley Rein LLP, with Jeremy Broggi, an Associate with the firm.*  Wiley Rein LLP represents the United States Chamber of Commerce as amicus in American Beverage Ass’n v. San Francisco.

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The tide may be turning on commercial free speech in the context of forced disclosures and warnings, as parties wait for further clarification from the Supreme Court on the level of protection due private speech.  The Ninth Circuit’s recent en banc decision in American Beverage Association v. City and County of San Francisco, No. 16-16072 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2019), is a limited step in the right direction, though as concurring opinions make clear, much more needs to be done to fix the doctrinal confusion about compelled speech and properly limit the power of government. Continue reading “Ninth Circuit Narrowly Vindicates First Amendment in Bellwether Compelled Speech Case”

Knick v. Scott Township: Whack-a-Mole at the Supreme Court

whackToday’s Supreme Court argument in Knick v. Scott Township made clear that state and local governments are playing Whack-a-Mole with private property rights. Whack-a-Mole is the arcade game in which every time a mole is whacked down, a new one pops up. At issue in Knick is whether to overturn the Court’s 1985 Williamson County decision, which held that Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claimants are generally relegated to state court.

When property rights advocates subsequently pointed out that Williamson County effectively barred property owners from ever asserting their Fifth Amendment rights, state and local governments persuaded the Court to re-interpret the nature of a Takings Clause violation (in its 2005 San Remo Hotel decision) to eliminate the no-right-to-assert problem. But when Justice Gorsuch suggested at today’s oral argument that this revised interpretation of the Takings Clause undercuts Williamson County’s rationale, the attorney for Scott Township denied the validity of the revised interpretation—in effect arguing that San Remo ought to be overruled. Continue reading Knick v. Scott Township: Whack-a-Mole at the Supreme Court”

Ninth Circuit Judges Call for En Banc Review of FTC’s Authority to Obtain Monetary Relief

Featured Expert Contributor, Antitrust & Competition Policy — Federal Trade Commission

By M. Sean Royall, a Partner with Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, with Blaine H. Evanson, and Richard H. Cunningham, Partners, and Brandon J. Stoker, an Associate, with the firm.

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Less than two years ago, David Vladeck, a Professor at Georgetown University Law Center who served as the Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection from 2009 to 2012, described the argument that the FTC Act does not permit the agency to obtain equitable monetary relief as “repeatedly and uniformly rejected by every court to address it.”  Two Ninth Circuit judges, however, recently signaled that the landscape in this area may be changing in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2017 Kokesh v. SEC decision.

In an extraordinary procedural move, on December 3, 2018, Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, joined by Judge Carlos T. Bea, wrote a special concurrence to his majority opinion in FTC v. AMG Capital Management, LLC et al., in which he described permitting the FTC to obtain monetary relief under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act as “an impermissible exercise of judicial creativity” that “contravenes the basic separation-of-powers principle that leaves to Congress the power to authorize (or to withhold) rights and remedies.”  Slip Op. at 36.  The concurrence called on the Ninth Circuit to hear the case en banc to reconsider its 2016 decision in in FTC v. Commerce Planet, Inc.,* which held that  the FTC may obtain monetary relief pursuant to Section 13(b), and walked through how the Kokesh decision calls the reasoning of Commerce Planet into question. Continue reading “Ninth Circuit Judges Call for En Banc Review of FTC’s Authority to Obtain Monetary Relief”

Games People Play: Supreme Court Can Put a Stop to an Obvious CAFA Workaround

Featured Expert Contributor, Litigation Strategies

Joe G. Hollingsworth, a Partner at Hollingsworth LLP, with Katharine R. Latimer, a Partner at the firm and a member of WLF’s Legal Policy Advisory Board.

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Earlier this fall, the Supreme Court took up the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) when it granted certiorari in Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 880 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2018).  We’re hoping for a slap-down because the Home Depot decision and its ilk improperly deny an entire sub-category of defendants protection from abusive state court class actions.

CAFA is an important statutory safeguard that Congress enacted to rectify serious class action abuses in state courts.  See CAFA, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 13 (2005).  Congress expressly found that ungainly and abusive interstate class actions “(A) harmed class members with legitimate claims and defendants that have acted responsibly; (B) adversely affected interstate commerce; and (C) undermined public respect for our judicial system.”  CAFA § 2(a)(2) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1711 notes). Continue reading “Games People Play: Supreme Court Can Put a Stop to an Obvious CAFA Workaround”

Kimberly-Clark Seeks Supreme Court Review in “Flushable” Wipes Case

roibal_lucia_webGuest Commentary

By Lucía Roibal, an Associate with Morrison & Foerster LLP in the firm’s San Francisco, CA office. This commentary is reposted with permission, originally appearing on November 30, 2018 in the firm’s Class Dismissed  blog.

On September 6, 2018, Kimberly-Clark and affiliates filed a petition for writ of certiorari in Kimberly-Clark, et al. v. Davidson, No. 18-304, following a decision in the Ninth Circuit denying Kimberly-Clark’s motion to dismiss.  As noted in previous posts (here and here), the Ninth Circuit had resolved a split among district courts in the circuit and held that a previously deceived consumer may have standing to seek an injunction against false advertising or labeling if he or she sufficiently alleges intent to repurchase the product in the future.  In Kimberly-Clark’s petition, the companies ask the Supreme Court to resolve the issue of whether a consumer, who after using a product and determining that a representation concerning that product is allegedly misleading, can plausibly allege a “real and immediate threat” that she will be deceived by the same representation in the future so as to establish standing to seek an injunction. Continue reading “Kimberly-Clark Seeks Supreme Court Review in “Flushable” Wipes Case”

Update: Justices Seek Federal Government’s Views on Pending Clean Water Act Suit Petitions

supreme courtIn a November 20 Featured Expert Contributor post, Cert Petitions May Mean Supreme Court Will Clarify Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, Sidley Austin LLP partner Sam Boxerman and his colleague Ben Tannen discussed two related certiorari petitions pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. Both petitions ask the Court to review circuit court decisions that held discharges through groundwater are an addition of a pollutant to “waters of the United States” from a point source.

Today, the Court released an Order calling for the views of the Solicitor General on the petitions in Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, Case No. 18-260 (Aug. 27, 2018) and Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P. v. Upstate Forever, Case No. 18-268 (Aug. 28, 2018).

The Order asked the Solicitor General to provide his views on the petitions by Friday, January 4, 2019.

What Did We Learn From the Supreme Court Oral Argument in Apple v. Pepper?

supreme courtWe’ve blogged previously about the Supreme Court’s biggest antitrust case of the October Term 2018, Apple v. Pepper. The case asks the Court to decide whether iPhone users who buy apps from Apple’s App Store may sue Apple for alleged antitrust violations, or whether only third-party app developers may bring such claims. The answer turns on whether and how the Court applies the rule announced in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, which holds that only the direct purchaser of a good or service may sue an allegedly abusive monopolist for damages.

The Court heard oral argument in the case on Monday morning. Apple is represented by Daniel Wall of Latham & Watkins. He argues that the Illinois Brick rule is dispositive here for Apple because the plaintiffs’ antitrust claim hinges on precisely the sort of “pass through” theory of harm that Illinois Brick prohibits. Continue reading “What Did We Learn From the Supreme Court Oral Argument in Apple v. Pepper?”