By Logan Cochran, Judge K.K. Legett Fellow at Washington Legal Foundation and a rising third-year student at Texas Tech University School of Law.
For the second time in less than a year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has ruled on minor consumers’ claims that Google and Viacom had “unlawfully collected personal information about them on the Internet, including what webpages they visited and what videos they watched on Viacom’s websites.” In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation. Although several issues raised by the plaintiffs substantially overlapped with the Third Circuit’s November 2015 decision In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation, two claims involved questions of first impression for the court: (1) a violation of the federal Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), and (2) an alleged invasion of privacy under New Jersey law. Continue reading
Featured Expert Column − Toxic Tort and Environmental Litigation
Richard O. Faulk, Esq., a Partner with Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP serving clients in Texas and Washington DC.
Since the United States Supreme Court’s Skidmore v. Swift & Co., and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. rulings, the role of judicial deference in administrative law has expanded exponentially. For example, agencies now receive deference, under the Court’s Auer v. Robins decision, even if their own drafting creates the very vagaries and ambiguities that require interpretation. Courts also defer to agencies’ interpretations of statutes they are charged to administer (Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC) and to scientific conclusions reached in the course of the regulatory process (Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC). By indulging these perspectives, the courts necessarily surrender their constitutional authority to “say what the law is,”1 and contribute to an arrogation of administrative power that threatens not only our constitutional separation of powers, but also their balance.2
Regulatory agencies have grown into what some call a “fourth branch” of our federal government.3 The threat posed by this de facto branch, also known as the “Administrative State”4 or, more colorfully, our “Junior Varsity Congress,”5 has attracted the growing attention of a number of Supreme Court justices. Continue reading
Featured Expert Contributor – Intellectual Property (Patents)
Jeffri A. Kaminski, Venable LLP
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent Halo Electronics, Inc v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. decision changes the standard for awarding enhanced damages in patent litigation. The ruling reversed a 2015 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decision that maintained that court’s longstanding approach to awarding enhanced damages.
In Halo, the Court altered the law on enhanced damages in three ways: 1) it eliminated the requirement to show objective recklessness; 2) it lowered the standard of proof from “clear and convincing evidence” to “preponderance of the evidence;” and 3) it adopted an abuse-of-discretion standard for the Federal Circuit’s review of a district court’s decision to grant enhanced damages. Continue reading
By Jeryn Crabb, Judge K.K. Legett Fellow at Washington Legal Foundation and a rising third-year student at Texas Tech University School of Law
With Spokeo v. Robins the US Supreme Court clarified the requirements necessary for plaintiffs to establish standing in federal court. Federal district courts are only beginning to explore those parameters, but the early applications are generally encouraging in one key area: data-breach class-action litigation.
In Spokeo, Mr. Robins alleged that Spokeo, a “people search engine,” violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by inaccurately reporting that he was married, employed, and in good financial standing. The Court held that a plaintiff bringing suit under a federal law that defines a statutory violation as harm must allege the existence of a concrete and particularized injury in order to have standing to sue. Continue reading
Featured Expert Column: Judicial Gatekeeping of Expert Evidence
By Evan M. Tager, Mayer Brown LLP, with Carl J. Summers, Mayer Brown LLP
Five years ago, the North Carolina General Assembly amended the North Carolina Rules of Evidence to mirror the Federal Rules of Evidence’s approach to expert testimony. In North Carolina v. McGrady, __ S.E.2d __, 2016 WL 3221096 (June 10, 2016), the Supreme Court of North Carolina finally confirmed that, as a result of the General Assembly’s adoption of language that mirrors that of the federal rules, the Daubert standard now governs the admission of expert testimony under state law.
The US Supreme Court first adopted the Daubert standard in 1993, interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to bestow a “gatekeeping role” on district courts. Shortly after Daubert, the Court elaborated on this standard in General Electric Co. v. Joiner and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael. And in 2000, the Supreme Court adopted amendments to Rule 702 that, while not expressly mentioning Daubert in their text, were clearly intended to formally embed the Daubert standard in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Continue reading
The U.S. Supreme Court: October 2015 Term Review
Speakers: The Honorable Jay Stephens, Kirkland & Ellis LLP; Andrew J. Pincus, Mayer Brown LLP; Elizabeth P. Papez, Winston & Strawn LLP; Jeffrey B. Wall, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
Our speakers discussed Court rulings in the areas of class actions, arbitration, the federal False Claims Act, intellectual property, federal regulation, and property rights.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s June 16, 2016 decision in a closely watched False Claims Act (FCA) case, Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, had a little bit in it for everyone. It held (as had most of the federal appeals courts) that a contractor can be held liable under the FCA for making a fraudulent claim for payment from the federal government, even if the claim was never expressly made but was merely implied. On the other hand, Universal Health unanimously vacated a First Circuit ruling that had reinstated the plaintiffs’ claims, concluding that the First Circuit applied an insufficiently rigorous test for determining whether the defendant’s allegedly false claims were “material.”
So which side really “won” the case? If the correct answer to that question turns on whether the Court’s decision will make it more difficult for private relators to prevail in future FCA cases, then the decision was a win for FCA defendants. For example, the Court unequivocally rejected assertions—frequently raised by FCA plaintiffs—that an FCA claim is proven any time a contractor submits a claim for payment of a contractual claim despite awareness that it has breached a significant provision of its contract. Continue reading