Featured Expert Column—Judicial Gatekeeping of Expert Evidence
Evan M. Tager, a Partner in the Washington, DC office of Mayer Brown LLP, with Carl J. Summers, an Associate with Mayer Brown LLP.
In a victory for keeping junk science out of courtrooms, Missouri recently enacted H.B. 153, which adopts the Daubert standard.
H.B. 153 establishes four criteria for an expert witness’s testimony:
(1) The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (2) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (3) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (4) The expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
These criteria mirror Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Daubert standard.
Although H.B. 153 applies broadly, it is not universally applicable. It does not apply in certain family and juvenile court proceedings. In addition, H.B. 153 does not permit an expert witness in a criminal case to testify “whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.” Continue reading
By Sara Kobak, W. Michael Gillette, and Aukjen Ingraham, Shareholders with Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, P.C. in Portland, OR.
Since the US Supreme Court clarified the due-process limits on the exercise of general or all-purpose jurisdiction in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014), plaintiffs have reached for new arguments to support the exercise of general jurisdiction over corporate defendants in forums where the defendants cannot fairly be considered “at home.” With notable exceptions—including the decisions at issue in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, Case No. 16-466, and Tyrell v. BNSF Railway Co., Case No. 16-405, both scheduled for argument before the Supreme Court on April 25, 2017—the majority of lower courts have rejected these attempts to evade Daimler and its due-process requirements. The most recent examples of decisions enforcing Daimler come from the high courts of Oregon and Missouri, with the Washington Legal Foundation submitting an amicus brief in the Oregon case. Continue reading
In creating the federal judicial branch, the Framers of the US Constitution did not intend that courts would right every possible wrong. Article III authorizes federal courts to resolve “Cases” and “Controversies.” The US Supreme Court has interpreted that power to mean that civil-litigation plaintiffs must prove they suffered an “injury in fact,” which is concrete and particularized, and not speculative. We’ve discussed Article III standing jurisprudence here in numerous contexts, most frequently in consumer class actions targeting food labels or data-security breaches, areas where the ever-amorphous concept of “economic harm” is often alleged. A March 6, 2017 Seventh Circuit decision, Eike v. Allergan, Inc. et al., shot down an especially outlandish attempt to expand standing based on an alleged economic injury. Continue reading
Civil Justice/Class Actions
Frank Cruz-Alvarez, a Partner in the Miami, FL office of Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. with Rachel Forman, an Associate with the firm.
On February 6, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in the consolidated appeal Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017), affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the plaintiff veterans’ putative class-action claims against the Secretary of Veterans Affairs and Dorn Veterans Affairs Medical Center (“Dorn VAMC”) officials for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs “failed to establish a non-speculative, imminent injury-in-fact for purposes of Article III standing.” Id. at 267. Continue reading
As the Internet increasingly has become the dominant means of conveying both facts and opinions, the number of defamation and other speech-related lawsuits filed in state and federal courts has risen markedly. Responding to what some lawmakers characterize as “strategic lawsuits against public participation” (SLAPP)—suits aimed at suppressing legitimate speech or public debate through imposing the financial burdens of litigation—many states have enacted so-called anti-SLAPP statutes. One characteristic feature of all anti-SLAPP statutes is that they provide an expedited mechanism whereby a defendant can have a qualifying SLAPP suit dismissed quickly. Continue reading
Featured Expert Column: Judicial Gatekeeping of Expert Evidence
By Evan M. Tager, Mayer Brown LLP, with Carl J. Summers, Mayer Brown LLP
Nearly a century ago, in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), the federal appeals court in the District of Columbia—the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit—announced the general acceptance test for evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony. Over the next several decades, the general acceptance test itself became generally accepted. But since the US Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and the adoption of that standard in Federal Rule of Evidence 702, many states have replaced Frye with Daubert. In Motorola, Inc. v. Murray, __ A.3d __, 2016 WL 6134870 (D.C. Oct. 20, 2016), the en banc District of Columbia Court of Appeals (the District of Columbia’s appellate court, distinct from the federal DC Circuit) expressly dispensed with the Frye standard and adopted Rule 702. Continue reading
Prior to the US Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, general jurisdiction existed over a business defendant in any state where it was incorporated, had its principal place of business, or its contacts were so “continuous and systematic” as to render them essentially at home in the forum state. Under this expansive interpretation, corporations could be subject to lawsuits in unpredictable and often remote jurisdictions.
Daimler significantly narrowed the reach of general jurisdiction by holding that because Daimler and MBUSA were neither incorporated nor had their principal place of business in California, Daimler’s contacts with California were not enough to render it at home in the state. Continue reading