Update: Ninth Circuit Softens its Decision in Flushable Wipes Case

roibal_lucia_webGuest Commentary

By Lucía Roibal, an Associate with Morrison & Foerster LLP in the firm’s San Francisco, CA office. This commentary is reposted with permission, originally appearing on May 17, 2018 in the firm’s Class Dismissed  blog.

On May 9, 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an Opinion amending its previous decision in Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 873 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2017).  As noted in a December 4, 2017 post on the 2017 decision, the Ninth Circuit had held that the fact that a plaintiff now knows the “truth” of an allegedly false advertisement does not foreclose injunctive standing.

In its amended Opinion, the panel clarifies its decision and refines the requirements for injunctive standing in the misbranding context in three ways: (1) it confirms that Article III injunctive standing requires plaintiffs to allege an intent to repurchase the product at issue; (2) it changes its previous stance that consumer protection laws would be gutted without injunctive relief; and (3) it holds that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a “concrete and particularized” injury as well as redressability. Continue reading “Update: Ninth Circuit Softens its Decision in Flushable Wipes Case”

Solicitor General Inveighs Against Antitrust-Law Revolution in SCOTUS “Apple v. Pepper” Amicus Brief

app storeEd. Note: With this post we welcome WLF’s newest attorney, Corbin K. Barthold, as a WLF Legal Pulse author.

Many legal disputes pit the affective and sometimes utopian thinking of lawyers against the statistical and efficiency-oriented thinking of economists. The archetypal lawyer subscribes to the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium—“where there is a right, there is a remedy.” The archetypal economist is more likely to agree with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s view that “such words as ‘right’ are a constant solicitation to fallacy.”

In antitrust cases, at least, the Supreme Court often sides with the economists. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), is a good example. It says that only the direct purchaser of an abusive monopolist’s goods or services may sue the monopolist for violating the antitrust laws. Someone who buys a product only indirectly—someone who, say, buys from a retailer who buys from an antitrust-law-violating manufacturer—is out of luck. She may not sue even if the retailer incorporated some of the supracompetitive wholesale price into the retail price. It would be too difficult, Illinois Brick concludes, to accurately apportion damages among distributers, retailers, and consumers. Continue reading “Solicitor General Inveighs Against Antitrust-Law Revolution in SCOTUS “Apple v. Pepper” Amicus Brief”