The US Supreme Court on October 3, 2017 will hear oral arguments for the second time in an important immigration case, Jennings v. Rodriguez. The Court was unable to reach a decision the first time around, apparently because it divided 4-4 on how to resolve the case. A key issue in the case is which constitutional body—Congress or the federal courts—gets to make policy governing the treatment of aliens convicted of serious crimes.
An unbroken line of Supreme Court precedent (including 1976’s Mathews v. Diaz) provides a ready answer to that question: immigration policy is “so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.” Congress determined that aliens convicted of serious crimes should be deported and should be detained pending final removal; courts should not be second-guessing that determination. Continue reading
Featured Expert Contributor, Judicial Gatekeeping of Expert Evidence
By Evan M. Tager, a Partner in the Washington, DC office of Mayer Brown LLP, with Carl J. Summers, an Associate with Mayer Brown LLP.
In federal courts, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. applies not only to scientific testimony but also to technical and other specialized knowledge. That principle stems from the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 702(a)—which expressly references an “expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge”—and the US Supreme Court’s holding in Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, which extended Daubert’s gatekeeping responsibilities to technical and specialized knowledge. Put simply, Daubert provides a generally applicable rule for how federal judges should ascertain the reliability of expert testimony.
The same is not true in Alabama. In 2011, the Alabama Legislature adopted the Daubert standard and modified Alabama Rule of Evidence 702 to provide: Continue reading
Featured Expert Contributor, Corporate Governance/Securities Law
Stephen M. Bainbridge, William D. Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
Matthew Martoma was a portfolio manager at S.A.C. Capital Advisors, LLC, a hedge fund owned and managed by Steven A. Cohen, which had been the subject of numerous insider trading investigations. One of those investigations resulted in Martoma being charged with insider trading on the stocks of a pair of drug companies developing a new Alzheimer’s disease drug treatment. Martoma had received tips of material nonpublic information about the treatment from two drug company employees. Martoma was convicted and appealed.
In a 2-1 opinion by Chief Judge Katzmann, the Second Circuit affirmed Martoma’s conviction. Its decision in United States v. Martoma is the first major interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Salman v. United States, and the first effort to determine the remaining scope, if any, of the Second Circuit’s 2014 decision in United States v. Newman. Continue reading
Featured Expert Contributor, Mass Torts—Asbestos
Robert H. Wright, a Partner with Horvitz & Levy LLP in Los Angeles, CA
A recent appellate decision rejecting the consumer expectations test for strict liability in a pharmaceutical case calls into question the use of that same test in cases involving low-dose exposures to asbestos. Trejo v. Johnson & Johnson, 13 Cal. App. 5th 110, 117 (2017), petition for review filed, (Aug. 8, 2017) (No. S243672).
Much like in pharmaceutical cases, the trials in low-dose asbestos cases invariably center on competing expert-opinion testimony regarding scientific matters beyond the everyday experience of ordinary consumers. As a result, such cases should proceed not under a consumer expectations theory, but instead under the alternative risk-benefit theory, which is recognized in many states and has long been applied to hold that a product is defectively designed if “‘the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.’” Tabieros v. Clark Equipment Co., 944 P.2d 1279, 1310 (Haw. 1997), quoting Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 455-56 (1978); see, e.g., Lamkin v. Towner, 563 N.E.2d 449, 457 (1990) (applying Barker). Continue reading
In early 2013, when Australian teenager Matt Corby took to social media to share a photo of his recently purchased Subway “foot long” sandwich next to a tape measure revealing that the sandwich measured only 11 inches in length, he never could have anticipated the “viral” chain of events that he had just set into motion.
Other Subway customers and media outlets soon descended on Subway franchises to undertake their own sandwich measurements, prompting the New York Post to announce that “Some Subway ‘Footlong’ Subs Don’t Measure Up.” According to the Post, four out of seven footlong sandwiches randomly purchased at Subway restaurants in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens measured less than 12 inches in length (ranging from 11 to 11.5 inches). Continue reading
We begin Fall 2017 blogging with an appreciative farewell.
This past Friday, September 1, US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner announced his retirement, effective immediately. He served on the circuit for 36 years, having been appointed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981.
Judge Posner was a principled skeptic of lawyer-driven litigation which, not surprisingly, led us to discuss a number of his opinions here at the WLF Legal Pulse.
Most recently, in Eye Drops, Water Fountains for Cats, and the Demise of a No-Injury Class Action, we recounted the unusual analogy Judge Posner used in his majority opinion to support the court’s dismissal of an especially officious no-injury class action filed against the makers of eye drops. Continue reading
By John F. Querio, a Partner, and Lacey L. Estudillo, an Appellate Fellow, with Horvitz & Levy LLP.
On July 13, 2017, the California Supreme Court decided Williams v. Superior Court, which expanded a plaintiff’s discovery rights in actions brought pursuant to California’s Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). PAGA permits an employee to bring a representative action “‘on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees’ to recover civil penalties” for wage-related violations of California’s Labor Code—penalties that were previously recoverable solely by the state’s labor-law enforcement agencies. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756 v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 993, 1003 (2009). Continue reading