A petition for writ of certiorari filed with the U.S. Supreme Court on July 17 (the respondent’s reply is still pending) may provide the justices with a timely opportunity to clarify the Court’s jurisprudence on compelled speech. The case, Anthem Prescription Management v. Beeman, involves the increasingly common practice by government of enlisting private enterprises to communicate certain messages against their will. As we have discussed here recently, the lower federal courts are fractured over the amount of First Amendment scrutiny judges should apply when businesses challenge such speech mandates.
Laws Correcting Deception. Beginning with Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel in 1985, the Supreme Court has developed a consistent jurisprudence on compelled speech for commercial enterprises. Zauderer recognized businesses’ First Amendment rights to communicate with consumers about their products. But the Court noted that such protection is minimal for misleading or false commercial speech. It held that “an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.” The Court emphasized that the speech mandate must require “purely factual and uncontroversial information” and not be “unduly burdensome.”
Laws Not Targeting Deception. What if the government interest underlying a speech mandate is not correction of deception? In our opinion, the Court spoke quite clearly in Zauderer, carving out prevention of deception as a unique exception to the First Amendment’s heightened protection of commercial speech, and thus heightened scrutiny should still apply to other speech mandates. Continue reading
Ever since its final courtroom defeat earlier this summer in its long-running battle with holdout bondholders, Argentina has attempted to portray itself as a responsible debtor that wants to pay all legitimate obligations. The Kirschner regime claims that its July 2014 default on the nation’s bond repayment obligations was forced upon it involuntarily by U.S. District Judge Thomas Griesa. Argentina asserts that it wants to act responsibly by making interest payments on its external indebtedness and would do so but for the injunction issued by “crazy old Judge Griesa” at the request of holdout bondholders (or, as Argentina refers to them, “vulture funds”). But Argentina’s recent actions don’t match its rhetoric; it continues its well-established policy of refusing to pay obligations that it has no plausible basis for contesting. Argentina has expressed a desire to repair its tarnished reputation within financial markets, but nothing in its recent conduct suggests movement in that direction.
A good case in point is Republic of Argentina v. BG Group PLC, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court earlier this year. That case involved claims by BG Group, a British natural gas company, that Argentina had breached a contract by taking steps designed to drive BG Group out of business. In 2007, an international arbitration panel unanimously agreed and entered a $185 million judgment in favor of BG Group. Rather than paying the judgment, Argentina sought to appeal the arbitration award within the U.S. court system. After years of protracted litigation, the Supreme Court in March 2014 upheld the arbitration award. Continue reading
If government wants to force you to say something you would not otherwise express, it must have a very good reason for doing so. This bedrock First Amendment principle applies to individuals and business enterprises alike.
In July, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit—arguably the nation’s second most important federal court—carved away at this principle and the constitutional protection it provides. Below, we discuss how that court allowed a federal agency to repeatedly change its declared reason for compelling speech and in an en banc panel opinion improperly eased government’s burden to prove a substantial governmental interest.
District Court Challenge. The compelled speech at issue in American Meat Institute (AMI) v. USDA is a country of origin label (“COOL”) recording the place of birth, residence, and slaughter of the animal from which each cut of meat taken. In the proposed rule’s Statement of Benefits and Costs, USDA asserted the mandate was justified because “certain U.S. consumers valued the designation.” AMI argued in its public comments that this interest was neither governmental nor substantial. USDA responded in the final rule with a stunning tautology: our interest is substantial and governmental because Congress empowered us to impose the COOL mandate.
When AMI sued to enjoin COOL on July 25, 2013, the agency again shifted focus, advancing a new justification that never appeared in the administrative record: “correct misleading speech and prevent consumer deception.” The federal district court bought USDA’s made-for-litigation governmental interest while denying AMI’s motion. In permitting this new justification, Judge Jackson ignored a 1947 Supreme Court precedent, SEC v. Chenery Corp. That decision holds that when judging the propriety of agency action, courts are limited to what is in the administrative record. Continue reading
by Dee Wallander, a 2014 Judge K.K. Legett Fellow at the Washington Legal Foundation and a student at Texas Tech University School of Law.
In an overlooked but practically significant decision from its October 2013 term, Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the procedural impact of its 2011 bankruptcy decision, Stern v. Marshall. In Stern (a case that received more fanfare for its underlying facts—which featured the late model Anna Nicole Smith—than for its legal issues), the Court narrowly held that a bankruptcy court can preside over actions arising from bankruptcy, but cannot hear state-law claims independent of the bankruptcy action. More specifically, Stern held that Article III of the U.S. Constitution bars bankruptcy courts from adjudicating counterclaims to proofs of claims, even though such actions are permissible under 28 U.S.C. § 157 as “core” traditional bankruptcy claims. Despite the Court’s attempt to rule narrowly in Stern, lower courts’ varying interpretations of the decision have created confusion in the bankruptcy system.
Justice Thomas, who wrote the unanimous Executive Benefits opinion, carefully avoided a detailed analysis of Stern by discussing only the narrow statutory question of how federal district and bankruptcy courts should procedurally handle so-called Stern claims. Continue reading
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, sitting as an en banc panel of 11 judges, sent shock waves through the world of First Amendment enthusiasts on July 29 with its opinion in American Meat Institute v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture. We’re still digesting this compelled speech ruling, and will be producing a number commentaries over the next several weeks with our thoughts and insights from other experts.
But in the meantime, we couldn’t resist highlighting a wonderful quip in Judge Janice Rogers Brown’s dissent and how it relates to a dissent by Justice Antonin Scalia in a 2013 opinion (which borrowed a concept from 18th Century philosopher, jurist, and utilitarianism proponent Jeremy Bentham).
Upon reading American Meat Institute, an attorney who’s written publications for WLF on commercial speech called to our attention Judge Brown’s creative phrasing, which he thought rivals a quip he recalled Justice Scalia making last year in Maryland v. King.
At the outset of her American Meat Institute dissent, Judge Brown stated, “If, as Jeremy Bentham once quipped, a fanciful argument may be dismissed as ‘nonsense upon stilts,’ the court’s analysis in this case can best be described as delirium on a pogo stick.” Such an intelligently cutting statement is not at all unusual for Judge Brown, whose well-written and cogently reasoned opinions are often peppered with witty historical references. An NPR report about Judge Brown’s U.S. Senate confirmation hearings noted that her opinion writing “reminds [one] very much of Justice Scalia’s writing style.” Continue reading
The Supreme Court press and other court observers have spilled a lot of ink this past month discussing the cases the Supreme Court took and decided during October Term 2013. Relatively little was said about the cases the court chose not to decide—and it passed over some doozies. But as Rush drummer and lyricist Neil Peart put it so eloquently, “If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice.”
Pro-Business? Journalists like to portray the Roberts Court as particularly business friendly (see, e.g., here , here, and here; but see here), but businesses asked the Court to take plenty of cases this past term that it instead declined. When the Court denies cert in cases of such importance to business at the same time that it has a historically light docket, it can hardly be said to be pro-business. Companies crave legal certainty, so even if the Court took these cases and decided them against business interests, many times simply settling contested questions would be better than leaving them up in the air.
Wanted: More Business Cases. The Court needs to hear more business cases than it currently is, for at least two reasons. First, the unprecedented proliferation of new regulations by this administration has given rise to many more conflicts of the kind that produce Supreme Court cases. Second, to the extent the Clinton-and-Obama-appointee-dominated lower courts are predisposed against business litigants (or, more charitably, deciding close questions consistently against them), businesses will appeal more cases to the Supreme Court when they believe a lower court has denied them justice. Of course the Supreme Court justices take neither of these criteria into consideration when assessing individual cases, but surely these factors matter when assessing whether the Court leans in favor of business in forming its docket. Continue reading
In its late June decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously invalidated President Obama’s efforts to make three recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board. The Court was sharply divided, however, on the rationale for its decision. Five justices joined Justice Breyer’s majority opinion, which rejected the most sweeping challenges to the recess appointments and ruled against the Administration on the much narrower ground that the Senate was not, in fact, in recess at the time that the appointments were made. As a long-time advocate of judicial restraint, I applaud the narrow approach adopted by Justice Breyer. Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring only in the judgment would have had the effect of preventing future Presidents from making recess appointments except in the rarest of circumstances. To me, it illustrates the shortcomings of originalism as a means of ensuring judicial restraint.
Article II of the Constitution mandates that the President ordinarily must obtain “the Advice and Consent of the Senate” before appointing an officer of the United States. The Recess Appointments Clause creates a limited exception to that requirement by authorizing the President, on a temporary basis, “to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate.” Noel Canning forced the Court to construe the meaning of two phrases contained in the clause.
First, what is meant by “the Recess of the Senate?” Those challenging the NLRB appointments claimed that the phrase refers only to an inter-session recess, i.e., a break between formal sessions of Congress. On the other hand, President Obama asserted (as have all recent Presidents) that the phrase also encompasses an intra-session recess, such as a summer recess in the midst of a session. The NLRB appointments would have been improper under the challengers’ interpretation because the Senate indisputably was not on an inter-session recess at the time of the appointments.
Second, what is the scope of the phrase “Vacancies that may happen?” The challengers asserted that the phrase refers only to vacancies that first come into existence during a recess. President Obama (and his predecessors dating back for at least a century) urged a broader reading that would also encompass vacancies that arise prior to a recess but continue to exist during that recess. The NLRB appointments would have been improper under the challengers’ interpretation because they were made to fill offices that first became vacant before the start of the recess in question.