A Swing and a Miss by the Missouri Supreme Court

Tortfeasor?

Tortfeasor?

Have you ever been to a sporting event where the mascot and other cheerleaders shoot t-shirts and toss hot dogs into the crowd during lulls in the action? Fun for the whole family, right? Well thanks to a ruling from the Missouri Supreme Court, don’t be surprised if this tradition becomes a thing of the past.

In a unanimous ruling last month overturning a local jury’s verdict in favor of my hometown Kansas City Royals, Judge Paul C. Wilson and his Missouri Supreme Court colleagues decided, as a matter of law, that the risk of being injured by a hot dog toss is not one of the risks inherent in watching a Royals home game at Kauffman Stadium. John Coomer v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corporation.

You’ve got to be kidding me. Baseball and hot dogs go together like mom and apple pie. At a professional baseball game where balls, broken bats, and even fielders fly into the stands, and patrons must be alert at all times to avoid injury, the risk of being injured by a flying hot dog is somehow excluded?   That decision defies logic and common sense.

A baseball game is not merely about what happens during the contest. It is a full-scale entertainment experience. For the prices that major league teams charge for games these days, they have to offer more entertainment than just the action between the lines—however thrilling this season is for long-suffering Royals fans. In the (hot) dog days of summer, baseball fans assume the risk of the sideshow right along with the main event.

Frequent spectator John Coomer allegedly suffered a detached retina when he failed to see a free hot dog coming his way. That is no laughing matter. And so he sued. But the antics of Sluggerrr, the adorable lion mascot who was not around when I was a kid—including his tossing free hot dogs to fans in the stands—is very much a part of today’s entertainment package. Continue reading

There’s Nothing “New” about “Lone Pine” Orders for Active Case Management

faulkFeatured Expert Column − Complex Serial and Mass Tort Litigation

by Richard O. Faulk, Hollingsworth LLP*

To listen to the plaintiffs’ bar, you’d think that “Lone Pine” orders were a novelty recently conjured out of “thin air” by creative defense lawyers—or a device unsupported by any significant precedents. But although those orders may seem new to the uninitiated, they have deep roots in the history of active case management.

Many lawyers know—or have learned the hard way—why these case management tools are called “Lone Pine” orders, and what they are intended to accomplish. In Lore v. Lone Pine Corporation, No. L-03306-85, 1986 WL 637507 (N.J. Sup.Ct. Nov. 18, 1986), the plaintiffs claimed injuries resulting from contamination allegedly coming from a landfill. When the defendants presented a government investigation that found no offsite contamination, the court required the plaintiffs to make a preliminary showing of exposure, injury, and causation before allowing full discovery to proceed. This ruling led to other cases which recognized the propriety of “Lone Pine” orders when doubt existed “over what medical condition or disease, if any, can be causally related to the toxic agent exposure alleged by each plaintiff.”2 Lawrence G. Cetrulo, Toxic Torts Litigation Guide § 13:49 (2013). Since then, “Lone Pine” order have proliferated, not only in toxic tort litigation, but also in other types of cases.See generally, David B. Weinstein and Christopher Torres, Managing the Complex: A Brief Survey of Lone Pine Orders, 34 Westlaw Envt’l J. 1 (Aug. 21, 2013) (providing extensive list of categorized cases). Continue reading

The California Supreme Court’s Iskanian Opinion: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back

jenkinsGuest Commentary

by Kirk C. Jenkins, Sedgwick LLP*

On June 26, 2014, the California Supreme Court issued its long-awaited opinion in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles LLC. The decision was something of a mixed bag for the defense bar: two major steps forward in the California Supreme Court’s class action jurisprudence, but one step back of uncertain significance.

The plaintiff in Iskanian worked as a driver for the defendant in 2004 and 2005. Halfway through his employment, he signed an agreement providing that “any and all claims” arising out of his employment would be submitted to binding arbitration before a neutral arbitrator. The plaintiff agreed not to bring a representative action either in court or before the arbitrator.

A year after leaving his employment, the plaintiff filed a putative class action complaint, alleging failure to pay overtime, provide meal and rest breaks, reimburse business expenses and various other violations of the Labor Code. The defendant moved to compel arbitration and the trial court granted the motion. But while the matter was pending before the Court of Appeal, the California Supreme Court decided Gentry v. Superior Court, holding that most class action waivers were unenforceable in employment cases. The defendant dropped its motion to compel. Continue reading

In Oklahoma, Class Action Fairness Act Comes Up Short, But Daimler v. Bauman Does The Trick

OklahomaConcerns that businesses were being victimized by abusive lawsuits filed in state courts—in particular, nationwide class actions and mass actions—led Congress to adopt the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) in 2005. Congress intended that CAFA ease removal of class and mass actions from state to federal court. The law has had mixed results in that regard, , as plaintiffs’ lawyers have devised a variety of clever ways to evade CAFA and thereby ensure that their nationwide suits can remain in state court. If a recent Oklahoma state-court decision is any indication, however, the plaintiffs’ bar may finally have met its match: the Supreme Court’s January 2014 decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman. That decision imposed strict limitations on a court’s exercise of general jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. The Oklahoma court invoked Daimler to dismiss hundreds of plaintiffs from a mass action that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit already had deemed not removable under CAFA.

The case involved product liability claims by 702 individuals from 26 States, each of whom alleged that she had suffered injuries from pelvic mesh surgical devices manufactured by Ethicon, Inc. (a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson). CAFA permits removal to federal court of “mass actions” filed by 100 or more plaintiffs raising substantially similar claims. To reduce the risk of removal, the plaintiffs’ lawyers grouped the claims into 11 separate lawsuits, each containing fewer than 100 plaintiffs. Nonetheless, it was obvious that the plaintiffs wanted the cases tried together: they filed the lawsuits in a tiny Oklahoma county with only a single trial judge, thereby ensuring that all 702 claims would be heard by a single judge. They also took steps to prevent removal based on diversity of citizenship: they included at least one New Jersey resident as a plaintiff in each of the 11 lawsuits. Because the defendants have their principal places of business in New Jersey, the inclusion of one New Jersey plaintiff in each case eliminated complete diversity of citizenship and thus precluded removal based on diversity. Continue reading

Supreme Court Observations: Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund

supreme courtGuest Commentary

by Lyle Roberts, Cooley LLP

*Editor’s note: We are cross-posting this commentary from Mr. Roberts’s blog, The 10b-5 Daily, where it originally appeared. Mr. Roberts authored Washington Legal Foundation’s amicus brief in Halliburton.

The U.S. Supreme Court has issued a decision in the Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund case holding that defendants can rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance at the class certification stage with evidence of a lack of stock price impact. It is a 9-0 decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, although Justice Thomas (joined by Justices Alito and Scalia) concurred only in the judgment. As discussed in a February 2010 post on this blog, Halliburton has a long history that now includes two Supreme Court decisions on class certification issues. A summary of the earlier Supreme Court decision can be found here.

Under the fraud-on-the-market presumption, reliance by investors on a misrepresentation is presumed if the misrepresentation is material and the company’s shares were traded on an efficient market that would have incorporated the information into the stock price. The fraud-on-the-market presumption is crucial to pursuing a securities fraud case as a class action—without it, the proposed class of investors would have to provide actual proof of its common reliance on the alleged misrepresentation, a daunting task for classes that can include thousands of investors.

The fraud-on-the-market presumption, however, is not part of the federal securities laws. It was judicially created by the Supreme Court in a 1988 decision (Basic v. Levinson). In Halliburton, the Court agreed to revisit that decision, but ultimately decided that there was an insufficient “special justification” for overturning its own precedent. Continue reading

Five Ways to Undo your Own Class-Action Settlement

zero dollars“This settlement is so unfair, it cannot be fixed.”

That statement marked the beginning of the end of a federal district court judge’s opinion, as well as the class-action settlement to which the opinion referred. U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California Judge William Alsup’s May 29 opinion in Daniels v. Aéropostale West, Inc. provides a tutorial on how not to win judicial approval of a class-action settlement.

Ms. Daniels alleged that she and other employees of the trendy apparel retailer Aéropostale were denied non-discretionary bonus pay (i.e., overtime) in violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Judge Alsup conditionally certified the class in April 2013. Daniels provided notice to all employees in the class, and 594 opted into the suit. The parties filed a motion on April 24, 2014 seeking preliminary approval of a proposed settlement.

For reasons we will elaborate, Judge Alsup refused to grant approval. On June 12, the court entered an order decertifying Daniels, dismissing the claims, and extending the statute of limitations for 30 days so dismissed plaintiffs could pursue individual suits if they wish. The order noted that the parties agreed to the decertification, and that Aéropostale would make payment to any class member “who did not receive full payment for the overtime adjustment on any non-discretionary bonus earned during the collective action period.” The plaintiff’s lawyers agreed to provide notice of the action’s decertification at their own expense.

Lessons. In just 12 pages, Daniels offers litigants and their lawyers at least five lessons on how to undo your own class-action settlement.

Lesson #1: Be unresponsive to the court’s requests

In just the second paragraph of the opinion, Judge Alsup took the unusual step of noting the name and affiliation of all counsel of record in the case. This was not done to recognize their brilliant advocacy. As the rest of the opinion reveals, the lawyers, among other things, failed to provide the court with expert damage reports as required by federal procedural rules. After the parties filed their proposed settlement, the court had to ask twice for more information or corrections to the document. When pressed by Judge Alsup, Daniels’s lawyer could not state how much the plaintiff would ask the jury to reward. In addition, “Plaintiff’s counsel also failed to provide any specific information about overtime hours worked and non-discretionary bonuses paid.” Continue reading

Eighth Circuit Creates New Class Action Fairness Act Requirement, Sends Case to State Court

Cruz-Alvarez_FFeatured Expert Contributor – Civil Justice/Class Actions

Frank Cruz-Alvarez, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P. (co-authored with Talia Zucker, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P.)

On April 4, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit breathed new life into a proposed consumer class action lawsuit that was previously—and properly—dismissed with prejudice by the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota.     Instead of affirming the district court’s decision, the Eighth Circuit, in an attempt to save the lawsuit, reversed and remanded Melvin Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., — F.3d —-, 2014 WL 1356860 (8th Cir. Apr. 4, 2014), to the Minnesota state court where it originated. In doing so, the court’s ruling, either by design or by accident, undermined the framework and legislative purpose of the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”).

The case originated in May of 2012, when a group of consumers purporting to represent a putative class sued ConAgra Foods, alleging that some of the company’s Hebrew National beef products are not 100% kosher, as the label claims. 2014 WL 1356860 at *1.ConAgra manufactures Hebrew National meat products using beef slaughtered by AER Services, Inc. (AER). Id. The slaughtering takes place in the facilities of American Foods Group, LLC (AFG), which sells kosher meat to ConAgra and any remaining meat to third parties. Id. AER employs the religious slaughterers, and a third party kosher certification entity named Triangle K, Inc., monitors whether AER, AFG, and ConAgra comply with the kosher rules. Id.

ConAgra promotes the kosher requirements as a reason to purchase Hebrew National products, which cost more than similar non-kosher products. Id. The consumers claim, however, that manufacturing quotas—not kosher rules—is the deciding factor in whether certain meat is certified as kosher; and with a quota of 70% for kosher meat, the kosher inspection process has become defective and unreliable. Id. at *2. Consequently, the consumers maintain they have been misled into paying an “unjustified premium for Hebrew National’s ostensibly kosher beef.” Id. at *1. Continue reading

(Not) Inconceivable!: Florida Trial Judge Tosses Food Class Action on CAFA Grounds

Amy's KitchenIn a December 2013 post, Two More Food Labeling Class Action Rulings: Harbingers of the New Year?, we lauded Southern District of Florida Judge James Cohn for dismissing claims in a food-labeling class-action lawsuit based on the labeling of products that the plaintiff, Ms. Reilly, never actually purchased.

Judge Cohn issued two more opinions in Reilly v. Amy’s Kitchen, Inc. on March 7. After this one-two punch, the life of Reilly’s case may be no more.

In the first decision, Judge Cohn denied the plaintiff’s motion to reconsider his December 9 order that Reilly lacked standing to sue for alleged injuries caused by products she didn’t purchase. In the second, Judge Cohn dismissed the remaining claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We’ll focus on the second ruling here.

Amy’s Kitchen argued in its motion to dismiss that Reilly’s dramatically thinner suit (from 60 claims to 3 after the December 9 order) failed to achieve the requisite amount in controversy of $5 million under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Unlike the plaintiffs in these food-labeling class actions, who likely could never produce proof of their purchases if asked, the defendants had very precise sales records. Amy’s Kitchen presented evidence that during the period of time Reilly alleges she was injured, it sold only $1,045,993 of the supposedly offending pizzas, veggie burgers, and enchiladas in Florida.

Vizzini

Vizzini

Judge Cohn agreed that because Reilly never had standing to sue for all 60 products, she could not meet the $5 million amount-in-controversy requirement from the outset.  The court held it could dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction”unless it appears to a ‘legal certainty’ that Plaintiff’s remaining claims meet CAFA’s $5 million jurisdictional minimum.” Reilly attempted to argue that the value of the injunctive relief she sought, combined with attorneys’ fees, could elevate the three claims to $5 million. Judge Cohn found such a possibility (as Wallace Shawn’s Vizzini in The Princess Bride liked to say) “inconceivable,” which falls quite short of “legal certainty.”

Judge Cohn dismissed Reilly’s claims without prejudice, but it seems unlikely an amended complaint will change the judge’s mind. Reilly will proceed with her appeal of the trial court’s December 9 standing decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which, we expect, will be as unsuccessful as her motion to Judge Cohn for reconsideration.

Also published at WLF’s Forbes.com contributor page

New Corporate Survey Illustrates Burdens Of Document Preservation And Benefits Of Proposed Reform

computerpileWith the conclusion of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee’s public comment period last month, the first leg of what The Legal Pulse has described as the long and winding road to reform of the federal rules for discovery is now over. We have at last reached the “end of the beginning,” to borrow Churchill’s phrase.

Comments contributed by the business community conveyed the consistent message that the current rules encourage over-preserving documents, a practice that ill-serves the interests of justice. The committee record is replete with anecdotes demonstrating this point, but it had lacked aggregate data until recently. Enter a Preservation Costs Survey conducted by Professor William Hubbard (my former contemporary at the University of Chicago Law School who has returned to teach there now), which thoroughly documents systematic over-preservation of electronic materials and its profound costs. A summary of Professor Hubbard’s findings is available here.

Business Defendants’ Stories. In its comment to the Advisory Committee, 307,000-employee General Electric noted that in order to preserve information contained in emails alone, it is “faced with a universe of approximately 4,770 terabytes” of data. (Just 10 terabytes, by comparison, is roughly enough storage for the Library of Congress’s entire book collection.)  The comment cited one example from 2011 in an instance where litigation had not yet been filed. GE incurred “fees of $5.4 million to collect and preserve 3.8 million documents totaling 16 million pages.” The company also reported it must spend over $100,000 a year to simply maintain those documents.

Pfizer explained in its comment that it currently has over 300 active legal holds in place impacting over 80,000 employees. It preserves 5 billion emails, and expects that amount to grow by 1 billion per year. Allstate reported that in the past 5 years it has spent over $17 million on e-discovery costs alone.

Ford provided several case studies in its comment, including one arising from a suit in Montana. There, Ford’s legal staff invested more than 800 hours and paid outside lawyers $2 million to produce nine computer hard drives containing 360 gigabytes of documents and 1,200 witness transcripts from past lawsuits. The plaintiff was unsatisfied with Ford’s production and filed a motion for sanctions, which the court denied. In the end, the plaintiff sought to introduce one document from the massive trove it requested from Ford. Continue reading

Courts Endorse Businesses’ Using Forum-Selection Clauses As Litigation Management Tools

Guest Commentary

by Ross Coker*

Since its debut in the early 2000s, Google has grown at a startlingly rapid pace, becoming not only a global behemoth in the online search engine and advertising markets, but expanding its reach through smartphones, computer operating systems, and more.  Just this month, Google surpassed ExxonMobil as the world’s second largest company by market capitalization.

In the United States, such success inevitably makes one a target of class-action lawsuits.  To avoid being dragged into one of the country’s notorious Judicial Hellholes,® companies like Google include venue and forum selection clauses in their consumer contracts.  In addition to avoiding plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions, such clauses allow companies to resolve legal disputes close to “home” in a manner that minimizes disruption to conducting business.

A recent federal district court ruling, Rudgayzer et al. v. Google Inc., reflects the importance and effectiveness of these forum-selection clauses and clarifies their strategic underpinning.  Rudgayzer filed suit in the Eastern District of New York (EDNY) alleging improper notice after Google settled another class action suit involving the now-defunct “Buzz” product.  The judge dismissed Rudgayzer’s suit because the plaintiff had assented to Google’s consumer contract, which contained the forum-selection clause.

Santa Clara County, CA

Santa Clara County, CA

In order to reach that conclusion, the court had to first determine whether the clause could be enforced.  The court noted that the federal circuits are split on the legal standard to apply in this situation.  The Second Circuit, whose precedents bind the EDNY, permits dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) if the consumer was made aware of the forum-selection clause, the clause is mandatory by the terms of the contract, and state contract law permits the imposition of such a clause.  The plaintiff can escape the clause only if it can show that the transfer of its case would be “unreasonable or unjust.”  Continue reading