The WLF Legal Pulse has addressed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s patent litigation venue jurisprudence in several posts (here and here). That court issued two rulings this past March (In re Apple Inc. and In re Barnes & Noble, Inc.) that, in our opinion, incorrectly applied factors the Federal Circuit had previously relied upon to order patent suits transferred to more appropriate venues. On October 9, a unanimous three-judge panel added another twist to the Federal Circuit’s venue case law with In re Google Inc.
Background. Last October, non-practicing entity Rockstar Consortium filed a patent infringement suit in the Eastern District of Texas (EDTX) against five companies whose technology utilized Google’s Android operating system. At the end of 2013, Google filed a declaratory judgment action against Rockstar in the Northern District of California (NDCA) that involved the same patents that Rockstar was suing to enforce in Texas. Rockstar countersued Google in the NDCA and concurrently added Google as a defendant in the EDTX action. Rockstar then moved to transfer or dismiss the California action, which the NDCA denied. Google and its five customers petitioned the EDTX to stay Rockstar’s infringement action pending an outcome in the NDCA, or to transfer the case to California. EDTX Judge James Rodney Gilstrap denied the order, and the six companies appealed. Continue reading
Although the Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments on October 7 in a case addressing the scope of removal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)—Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens—Public Citizen has urged the Court to dismiss the case as improvidently granted based on what it views as procedural roadblocks to reaching the merits. Last Friday, Columbia Law Professor Ronald Mann’s column for SCOTUSblog spotlighted Public Citizen’s amicus argument and stated, “[M]y sense is that the jurisdictional question [raised by Public Citizen] will seem a lot more contestable to the Justices than the issue on the merits,” adding that the Court might even consider dismissing the petition. Mann is probably correct that the Court is likely to be unimpressed by the lower courts’ merits decision—that a removal petition is deficient unless accompanied by documentary evidence supporting the petition’s allegations that the prerequisites for removal have been met. But the Court is likely to be equally unimpressed by Public Citizen’s “jurisdictional” argument, which has not been raised by the parties at any stage of these proceedings.
Public Citizen bases its argument on the fact that the Tenth Circuit did not directly address the district court’s decision to remand a case removed from state court by the Petitioners under CAFA. CAFA permits defendants in class actions to appeal remand decisions, but they first must petition the appeals court for an order accepting the appeal. In this case, the Tenth Circuit (by an equally divided 4-4 vote) denied the defendants’ petition for permission to appeal. Public Citizen contends that the only issue properly before the Supreme Court is whether the Tenth Circuit abused its discretion in denying permission for an appeal, not whether the district court erred in remanding the case.
That contention is without merit. First, the issue raised by Public Citizen cannot even remotely be deemed “jurisdictional” in nature. The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over any case that has come before a federal appeals court, whether “before or after rendition of judgment or decree.” 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). Supreme Court jurisdiction does not depend on whether the appeals court has rendered a judgment on the merits of the trial court’s determination. Because this appeal came before the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review it. Continue reading
by Mark A. Behrens, Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.*
On September 9, the Supreme Court of Missouri struck down the state’s legislative limit on the amount of punitive damages that can be imposed on defendants. Under the cap, punitive damages could not exceed the greater of $500,000 or five times the net amount of the judgment. Lewellen v. Franklin arose from an unremarkable fraudulent misrepresentation and unlawful merchandising suit. In finding that the statutory damages cap violated Lewellen’s right to a jury trial, the Court followed a 2012 decision invalidating the state’s cap on non-economic damages in medical liability cases, Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers.
This holding is an extreme outlier. Virtually every other state court that has considered the constitutionality of punitive damages caps has held that such laws do not violate the jury trial right because the jury’s fact-finding function is preserved. The jury continues to resolve disputed facts with respect to liability and assessment of legally available remedies. Once the jury has decided these issues, the constitutional mandate is met—or at least is virtually every other state in the country. Nationally, both state and federal courts consistently have upheld the constitutionality of punitive damages caps. Continue reading
Have you ever been to a sporting event where the mascot and other cheerleaders shoot t-shirts and toss hot dogs into the crowd during lulls in the action? Fun for the whole family, right? Well thanks to a ruling from the Missouri Supreme Court, don’t be surprised if this tradition becomes a thing of the past.
In a unanimous ruling last month overturning a local jury’s verdict in favor of my hometown Kansas City Royals, Judge Paul C. Wilson and his Missouri Supreme Court colleagues decided, as a matter of law, that the risk of being injured by a hot dog toss is not one of the risks inherent in watching a Royals home game at Kauffman Stadium. John Coomer v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corporation.
You’ve got to be kidding me. Baseball and hot dogs go together like mom and apple pie. At a professional baseball game where balls, broken bats, and even fielders fly into the stands, and patrons must be alert at all times to avoid injury, the risk of being injured by a flying hot dog is somehow excluded? That decision defies logic and common sense.
A baseball game is not merely about what happens during the contest. It is a full-scale entertainment experience. For the prices that major league teams charge for games these days, they have to offer more entertainment than just the action between the lines—however thrilling this season is for long-suffering Royals fans. In the (hot) dog days of summer, baseball fans assume the risk of the sideshow right along with the main event.
Frequent spectator John Coomer allegedly suffered a detached retina when he failed to see a free hot dog coming his way. That is no laughing matter. And so he sued. But the antics of Sluggerrr, the adorable lion mascot who was not around when I was a kid—including his tossing free hot dogs to fans in the stands—is very much a part of today’s entertainment package. Continue reading
Featured Expert Column − Complex Serial and Mass Tort Litigation
by Richard O. Faulk, Hollingsworth LLP*
To listen to the plaintiffs’ bar, you’d think that “Lone Pine” orders were a novelty recently conjured out of “thin air” by creative defense lawyers—or a device unsupported by any significant precedents. But although those orders may seem new to the uninitiated, they have deep roots in the history of active case management.
Many lawyers know—or have learned the hard way—why these case management tools are called “Lone Pine” orders, and what they are intended to accomplish. In Lore v. Lone Pine Corporation, No. L-03306-85, 1986 WL 637507 (N.J. Sup.Ct. Nov. 18, 1986), the plaintiffs claimed injuries resulting from contamination allegedly coming from a landfill. When the defendants presented a government investigation that found no offsite contamination, the court required the plaintiffs to make a preliminary showing of exposure, injury, and causation before allowing full discovery to proceed. This ruling led to other cases which recognized the propriety of “Lone Pine” orders when doubt existed “over what medical condition or disease, if any, can be causally related to the toxic agent exposure alleged by each plaintiff.”2 Lawrence G. Cetrulo, Toxic Torts Litigation Guide § 13:49 (2013). Since then, “Lone Pine” order have proliferated, not only in toxic tort litigation, but also in other types of cases.See generally, David B. Weinstein and Christopher Torres, Managing the Complex: A Brief Survey of Lone Pine Orders, 34 Westlaw Envt’l J. 1 (Aug. 21, 2013) (providing extensive list of categorized cases). Continue reading
by Kirk C. Jenkins, Sedgwick LLP*
On June 26, 2014, the California Supreme Court issued its long-awaited opinion in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles LLC. The decision was something of a mixed bag for the defense bar: two major steps forward in the California Supreme Court’s class action jurisprudence, but one step back of uncertain significance.
The plaintiff in Iskanian worked as a driver for the defendant in 2004 and 2005. Halfway through his employment, he signed an agreement providing that “any and all claims” arising out of his employment would be submitted to binding arbitration before a neutral arbitrator. The plaintiff agreed not to bring a representative action either in court or before the arbitrator.
A year after leaving his employment, the plaintiff filed a putative class action complaint, alleging failure to pay overtime, provide meal and rest breaks, reimburse business expenses and various other violations of the Labor Code. The defendant moved to compel arbitration and the trial court granted the motion. But while the matter was pending before the Court of Appeal, the California Supreme Court decided Gentry v. Superior Court, holding that most class action waivers were unenforceable in employment cases. The defendant dropped its motion to compel. Continue reading
Concerns that businesses were being victimized by abusive lawsuits filed in state courts—in particular, nationwide class actions and mass actions—led Congress to adopt the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) in 2005. Congress intended that CAFA ease removal of class and mass actions from state to federal court. The law has had mixed results in that regard, , as plaintiffs’ lawyers have devised a variety of clever ways to evade CAFA and thereby ensure that their nationwide suits can remain in state court. If a recent Oklahoma state-court decision is any indication, however, the plaintiffs’ bar may finally have met its match: the Supreme Court’s January 2014 decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman. That decision imposed strict limitations on a court’s exercise of general jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. The Oklahoma court invoked Daimler to dismiss hundreds of plaintiffs from a mass action that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit already had deemed not removable under CAFA.
The case involved product liability claims by 702 individuals from 26 States, each of whom alleged that she had suffered injuries from pelvic mesh surgical devices manufactured by Ethicon, Inc. (a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson). CAFA permits removal to federal court of “mass actions” filed by 100 or more plaintiffs raising substantially similar claims. To reduce the risk of removal, the plaintiffs’ lawyers grouped the claims into 11 separate lawsuits, each containing fewer than 100 plaintiffs. Nonetheless, it was obvious that the plaintiffs wanted the cases tried together: they filed the lawsuits in a tiny Oklahoma county with only a single trial judge, thereby ensuring that all 702 claims would be heard by a single judge. They also took steps to prevent removal based on diversity of citizenship: they included at least one New Jersey resident as a plaintiff in each of the 11 lawsuits. Because the defendants have their principal places of business in New Jersey, the inclusion of one New Jersey plaintiff in each case eliminated complete diversity of citizenship and thus precluded removal based on diversity. Continue reading