Nice, but not good enough. That is the near-Pavlovian response professional activists routinely offer whenever their targets announce some voluntary action that, to the casual observer, seems to advance the activists’ agenda.
Consider, for instance, a September 23 Politico story, “Food, Beverage Firms to Dial Back Marketing to Kids.” The story reported on voluntary commitments International Food and Beverage Alliance member companies made to the World Health Organization regarding product marketing to children under 12. Those commitments include restrictions that nutrition activists have long sought from government regulators. Yet, there was the glass-half-empty response of Center for Science in the Public Interest’s (CSPI) nutrition policy director, Margo Wootan:
If they’re saying they’re covering all media, they’re not. They’re missing on-package marketing [and] in-store and on-display marketing.
Ms. Wootan’s comments confirm a theory WLF has been arguing for the past several years in the context of plain packaging initiatives for tobacco: activists have their sights on more than one category of consumer products. Continue reading
On September 4, with Safelite Group, Inc. v. Jepsen, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made an important contribution to the jurisprudence of compelled speech (an area of growing disharmony in the federal courts, as we’ve noted recently). The court unanimously struck down a Connecticut law that permitted certain businesses to promote their auto-glass repair services only if they mentioned the similar services of their competitors.
The Law at Issue. The Petitioner, Safelite Group, is an insurance claims management company that owns and operates a Connecticut affiliate, Safelite Auto Glass. If auto insurance companies direct Connecticut drivers with auto-glass claims to Safelite, Safelite can recommend (but, under state law, cannot require) Safelite Auto Glass to do the repairs. When it does so, Safelite voluntarily discloses its ownership interest to the insureds. If insureds cannot or do not want to utilize a Safelite Auto Glass shop, Safelite recommends another shop that Safelite has pre-approved.
Unaffiliated Connecticut auto-glass shops took their complaints about Safelite’s “unfair” practices to the legislature, which in May 2013 adopted a law that in part prohibits insurance companies or their claims administrators from mentioning their affiliate repair shops unless they also reference a competitor.
First Amendment Challenge. Safelite sought a preliminary injunction against Connecticut’s enforcement of the law, arguing in federal district court that the compelled speech requirement abridged its First Amendment rights. The district court denied the injunction, holding that the mandate simply required disclosure of factual, uncontroversial information that does not offend the company’s First Amendment freedoms. Continue reading
A petition for writ of certiorari filed with the U.S. Supreme Court on July 17 (the respondent’s reply is still pending) may provide the justices with a timely opportunity to clarify the Court’s jurisprudence on compelled speech. The case, Anthem Prescription Management v. Beeman, involves the increasingly common practice by government of enlisting private enterprises to communicate certain messages against their will. As we have discussed here recently, the lower federal courts are fractured over the amount of First Amendment scrutiny judges should apply when businesses challenge such speech mandates.
Laws Correcting Deception. Beginning with Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel in 1985, the Supreme Court has developed a consistent jurisprudence on compelled speech for commercial enterprises. Zauderer recognized businesses’ First Amendment rights to communicate with consumers about their products. But the Court noted that such protection is minimal for misleading or false commercial speech. It held that “an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.” The Court emphasized that the speech mandate must require “purely factual and uncontroversial information” and not be “unduly burdensome.”
Laws Not Targeting Deception. What if the government interest underlying a speech mandate is not correction of deception? In our opinion, the Court spoke quite clearly in Zauderer, carving out prevention of deception as a unique exception to the First Amendment’s heightened protection of commercial speech, and thus heightened scrutiny should still apply to other speech mandates. Continue reading
FDA’s proposed Nutrition Facts format
The Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) proposed addition of “added sugars” to the mandatory Nutrition Facts label on packaged food lacks scientific justification, is more likely to confuse than inform consumers, and will expose the agency to a constitutional challenge. So why is FDA pushing forward with this counterproductive idea?
In announcing proposed changes to the 20-year old “Nutrition Facts” label, FDA reminded us that the purpose of the ubiquitous label is to “help consumers make informed food choices and maintain healthy dietary practices.” The update ostensibly would provide, among other improvements, “greater understanding of nutrition science.” However, one of the update’s most highly touted additions—a new line item for “Added Sugars,” triple-indented under “Carbohydrates” and “Total Sugars”— thoroughly fails to achieve these stated goals and contradicts current nutrition science.
Uninformative. If the Nutrition Facts label exists to “help consumers to make informed food choices,” then shouldn’t FDA be certain that listing added sugars would in fact be helpful? The agency, though, acknowledges in its March 3 proposal that it is “not aware of any existing consumer research that has examined this topic.“
One public comment provided to FDA did offer consumer research, and the data thoroughly undercuts the “Added Sugars” proposal. The International Food Information Council (IFIC) Foundation conducted a consumer survey that conformed to OMB requirements for government research. The results revealed confusion among surveyed consumers over the meaning of “Added Sugars.” More than half of respondents believed that Added Sugars were different from the sugars included in “Total Sugars.” A substantial number believed that instead of being a part of the Total Sugars figure, Added Sugars should be added to Total Sugars. Consider, for instance, a bottle of sweetened iced tea, which is currently labeled to contain 22 grams of sugar per serving. None of the sugar is naturally occurring. If the proposed Nutrition Facts label is adopted in its entirety, consumers might look at the 22 grams of Total Sugars, and the 22 grams of Added Sugars, and conclude that the tea contains 44 grams per serving. In addition, the survey found that a majority of consumers felt that products listing added sugars contained more sugar than was actually present, a perception that would affect their purchasing decisions.
An agency whose mission is consumer protection must not mandate confusing or misleading label information. FDA should take heed of the IFIC Foundation research and do what it should have done from the start: study the issue before mandating that Added Sugars be listed. Continue reading
If government wants to force you to say something you would not otherwise express, it must have a very good reason for doing so. This bedrock First Amendment principle applies to individuals and business enterprises alike.
In July, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit—arguably the nation’s second most important federal court—carved away at this principle and the constitutional protection it provides. Below, we discuss how that court allowed a federal agency to repeatedly change its declared reason for compelling speech and in an en banc panel opinion improperly eased government’s burden to prove a substantial governmental interest.
District Court Challenge. The compelled speech at issue in American Meat Institute (AMI) v. USDA is a country of origin label (“COOL”) recording the place of birth, residence, and slaughter of the animal from which each cut of meat taken. In the proposed rule’s Statement of Benefits and Costs, USDA asserted the mandate was justified because “certain U.S. consumers valued the designation.” AMI argued in its public comments that this interest was neither governmental nor substantial. USDA responded in the final rule with a stunning tautology: our interest is substantial and governmental because Congress empowered us to impose the COOL mandate.
When AMI sued to enjoin COOL on July 25, 2013, the agency again shifted focus, advancing a new justification that never appeared in the administrative record: “correct misleading speech and prevent consumer deception.” The federal district court bought USDA’s made-for-litigation governmental interest while denying AMI’s motion. In permitting this new justification, Judge Jackson ignored a 1947 Supreme Court precedent, SEC v. Chenery Corp. That decision holds that when judging the propriety of agency action, courts are limited to what is in the administrative record. Continue reading
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, sitting as an en banc panel of 11 judges, sent shock waves through the world of First Amendment enthusiasts on July 29 with its opinion in American Meat Institute v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture. We’re still digesting this compelled speech ruling, and will be producing a number commentaries over the next several weeks with our thoughts and insights from other experts.
But in the meantime, we couldn’t resist highlighting a wonderful quip in Judge Janice Rogers Brown’s dissent and how it relates to a dissent by Justice Antonin Scalia in a 2013 opinion (which borrowed a concept from 18th Century philosopher, jurist, and utilitarianism proponent Jeremy Bentham).
Upon reading American Meat Institute, an attorney who’s written publications for WLF on commercial speech called to our attention Judge Brown’s creative phrasing, which he thought rivals a quip he recalled Justice Scalia making last year in Maryland v. King.
At the outset of her American Meat Institute dissent, Judge Brown stated, “If, as Jeremy Bentham once quipped, a fanciful argument may be dismissed as ‘nonsense upon stilts,’ the court’s analysis in this case can best be described as delirium on a pogo stick.” Such an intelligently cutting statement is not at all unusual for Judge Brown, whose well-written and cogently reasoned opinions are often peppered with witty historical references. An NPR report about Judge Brown’s U.S. Senate confirmation hearings noted that her opinion writing “reminds [one] very much of Justice Scalia’s writing style.” Continue reading
The Supreme Court press and other court observers have spilled a lot of ink this past month discussing the cases the Supreme Court took and decided during October Term 2013. Relatively little was said about the cases the court chose not to decide—and it passed over some doozies. But as Rush drummer and lyricist Neil Peart put it so eloquently, “If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice.”
Pro-Business? Journalists like to portray the Roberts Court as particularly business friendly (see, e.g., here , here, and here; but see here), but businesses asked the Court to take plenty of cases this past term that it instead declined. When the Court denies cert in cases of such importance to business at the same time that it has a historically light docket, it can hardly be said to be pro-business. Companies crave legal certainty, so even if the Court took these cases and decided them against business interests, many times simply settling contested questions would be better than leaving them up in the air.
Wanted: More Business Cases. The Court needs to hear more business cases than it currently is, for at least two reasons. First, the unprecedented proliferation of new regulations by this administration has given rise to many more conflicts of the kind that produce Supreme Court cases. Second, to the extent the Clinton-and-Obama-appointee-dominated lower courts are predisposed against business litigants (or, more charitably, deciding close questions consistently against them), businesses will appeal more cases to the Supreme Court when they believe a lower court has denied them justice. Of course the Supreme Court justices take neither of these criteria into consideration when assessing individual cases, but surely these factors matter when assessing whether the Court leans in favor of business in forming its docket. Continue reading