Whether U.S. antitrust laws reach wholly foreign conduct is a question that has been addressed by all levels of the federal court system over the past decade, including by the U.S. Supreme Court.1 Nevertheless, it is a question as to which many companies, in the U.S. and abroad, may feel there is not a clear answer. Consider, for example, a corporation that purchases a product in the U.S. that was finished or assembled overseas. If the finished product includes a component that the assembler purchased at a price that had been inflated by an overseas price-fixing conspiracy among the component manufactures, can the U.S. purchaser of the finished product sue the component seller in U.S. court for treble damages? Can the overseas assembler recover damages from the overseas component manufacturer in the U.S.? Or to put it another way, can a foreign corporation that manufactured and sold a product overseas, to an overseas assembler, be sued for price-fixing in the U.S. by a U.S. customer of the foreign assembler? It will come as no surprise that the answers to these questions are very fact-specific. But recently, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued a decision that helps clarify the law. Continue reading
Every five years, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) jointly issue the latest iteration of the federal government’s formal guidance on healthy eating, the Nutrition Guidelines. These Guidelines not only inform as to how government feeds its millions of employees (including the military) and those who eat in a government facility (i.e. public schools, prisons), but they also influence food-related laws and regulations.
A federal advisory committee is expected to report its recommended updates for the 2015 Guideline to HHS and USDA this month. If the committee’s proceedings and its December 15, 2014 interim report are any indication, the 2015 “My Plate” will feature supersized, empty-calorie portions of activism and food-nanny nagging. We should expect to be lectured on the need to eat “sustainably,” the imperative for mandated “added sugars” food labeling, and the importance of imposing marketing restrictions on certain foods.
The advisory committee. None of this comes as a surprise, given the makeup of the Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee (DGAC) and the motivations of the regulators at HHS and USDA who appointed its 15 members. Every single member hails from academia, and as one assessment of the DGAC and its work published by Capital Research Center noted,
There is not a single business owner, family physician, working nutritionist, food services executive, or federal nutrition program director in the mix.
WLF Amicus Briefs:
- King v. Burwell (On December 29, 2014, WLF asked the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse an appeals court ruling that, if upheld, would allow IRS to appropriate billions of dollars a year without authorization from Congress.)
- In re: Deepwater Horizon (On December 24, 2014, WLF filed a brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, urging it to remove the court-appointed Claims Administrator who evaluates all claims filed by those seeking to recover economic losses suffered as a result of the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill. )
- “Unfair Methods of Competition”: The Legislative Intent Underlying Section 5 of the FTC Act
By William Kolasky, a partner with the law firm Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP in its Washington, D.C. office. Foreword by A. Douglas Melamed, Herman Phleger Visiting Professor at Stanford Law School and former Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Intel Corporation.
- Issuer Banks and Data Breach Lawsuits: A New Wave Of Litigation?
By Philip M. Busman and John M. Kalas, a partner and an associate, respectively, with the law firm Hollingsworth LLP.
WLF Legal Pulse Posts
The contrasting perspectives of the stakes in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, an administrative law case that the U.S. Supreme Court will hear on Monday, December 1, could not be starker. Law professors are allegedly unanimous that the Court should reverse the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit doctrine at issue, a doctrine that, in their view, severely hampers the ability of federal administrative agencies to respond to changing conditions. On the other hand, lawyers representing regulated entities have rallied to the defense of the D.C. Circuit’s doctrine; they view it as an essential check on arbitrary agency rulemaking. What explains these contrasting visions? The explanation could lie in the ongoing battle over how much deference courts should accord to agencies’ interpretations of their own rules. At time when courts are increasingly deferential to agencies, regulated entities will forcefully act to preserve other tools—such as the D.C. Circuit doctrine at issue in Perez—to keep federal agencies in check.
Perez concerns the scope of notice-and-comment rulemaking. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires federal agencies, before they adopt a “substantive” or “legislative” rule, to provide notice of the proposed rule and a meaningful opportunity for members of the public to comment on the proposal. Exempted from the APA’s notice-and-comment requirement are “interpretive” rules. Agencies seek to avoid notice-and-comment requirements where possible; it is a burdensome process that can delay rulemaking for months and even years. Yet, despite nearly 70 years of APA litigation, the meaning of exempt “interpretive” rules has never been fully pinned down. Continue reading
Andrea Agathoklis Murino, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati
Consolidation in the health care industry, and the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC” or “Commission”) perspective on such activity, are being closely watched in antitrust law and policy circles. In April 2011, the FTC challenged the acquisition of Palmyra Park Hospital by Phoebe Putney Health System Inc. (“Phoebe”) in Albany, Georgia. The Commission argued that the combination would result in unduly high market shares (>85%) in the provision of acute care services in a six-county region and result in anticompetitive price increases. Shortly thereafter, the FTC sought and obtained a preliminary injunction (“PI”) from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia halting the transaction pending trial. Typical enough. But here’s where our story starts to take some strange twists. What began that April in a federal district court is an adventure leading from the Supreme Court to local Georgia healthcare regulatory bodies…and possibly, back again. Here’s what happened.
Phoebe responded to the PI not by throwing itself into a trial on the merits, but rather by filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds that by virtue of the state action doctrine, Phoebe’s conduct was permissible. Generally, the state action doctrine provides that where (1) there is a clearly articulated state policy to displace competition and (2) there is active supervision by the state of the policy or activity, otherwise anticompetitive activity will be permitted. Here, Phoebe argued that because it was owned by the Hospital Authority of Albany-Dougherty County, and operated under Georgia’s Hospital Authorities Law, it was immune. Phoebe prevailed on its motion to dismiss in the district court and then again at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Phoebe then completed its purchase of Palmyra, closing the transaction. Continue reading
In recognition of Free Speech Week, the WLF Legal Pulse celebrates what may be the First Amendment’s greatest virtue: it protects speech that may be unpopular due to the nature of the speaker or the medium within which it is spoken. We do so by applauding an October 20 U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruling that addressed a prior restraint on a method of communication that some disfavor—billboards—and that predominantly carries messages some consider unworthy of full constitutional protection—advertisements.
Unbridled regulatory authority. Section 302 of the Massachusetts Code of Regulations requires all outdoor advertisers to obtain both an operating license and a permit for each specific sign. The regulation vests the Director of the Office of Outdoor Advertising (“Director”) with broad discretion to grant, withhold, or revoke licenses and permits for billboards. Section 302 enumerates several factors that the Director “may” consider, including “health, safety, and general welfare” and “not [being] in harmony with the surrounding area.” The regulation, however, states the listed factors are non-exclusive and that the Director’s authority is “[w]ithout limitation.”
Van Wagner Communications, which lobbied against the 2012 amendments to Section 302, filed a facial challenge to the regulation in federal court, arguing that it imposed an unconstitutional prior restraint on the company’s speech. The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that because the Director had approved Van Wagner’s license and all 70 of its permit requests over two years, the company suffered no injury and thus lacked standing to sue. Continue reading
*Editor’s Note: With this post we welcome the participation in The WLF Legal Pulse of Featured Expert Contributor on Justice Department-related competition law and policy matters, Mark Botti. Mark is co-leader of Squire Patton Boggs’s Global Antitrust & Competition Practice Group and previously spent 13 years at DOJ’s Antitrust Division.
In 2001, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) declined to block the proposed merger of General Electric and Honeywell, allowing the deal to proceed with certain limited divestitures. Announced in October of 2000, that deal would bring together two significant players in a number of related market segments, including aircraft engines, avionics, and landing gear. Despite DOJ’s decision not to block the deal outright, the European Union reached a different result, forbidding the transaction under a “conglomerate merger” theory that has long been out of favor in the United States and has drawn significant criticism in the economic and legal literature.
These diverging enforcement decisions spawned a wave of criticism directed at both jurisdictions. How were multinational businesses in a global economy to order their affairs in the face of such conflicting enforcement theories and outcomes? Were they facing a “race to the bottom,” where the most aggressive enforcers effectively held a veto over the decisions of other competition agencies? Continue reading