Science and Federal Regulation: Is the Office of Management and Budget an Effective Gatekeeper?
WLF Media Briefing, Tuesday, May 19, 10:00-11:00 a.m. EDT
Location: 2009 Massachusetts Avenue, NW (WLF headquarters)—RSVP to firstname.lastname@example.org or click HERE for free registration to view program live online
The government of Venezuela has become a notorious abuser of private property rights, seizing the property of corporations and political opponents without offering any compensation. Unable to obtain redress in Venezuelan courts, property owners with increasing frequency have turned to U.S. courts for compensation. The U.S. Court of Appelas for the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits issued nearly simultaneous decisions earlier this month in suits filed by property owners against Venezuela. While the courts reached facially inconsistent results—the Eleventh Circuit dismissed one property owner’s claim while the D.C. Circuit allowed the claims of another group of property owners to move forward—the two courts sent a similar message. Both courts made clear that while they are reluctant to inquire into the validity of a foreign sovereign’s internal conduct, such judicial restraint does not prevent courts from protecting Americans’ rights when property is taken in clear violation of international law.
Any effort to sue a foreign sovereign in a U.S. court faces a major obstacle: the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The Supreme Court has held that the FSIA is the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts. The statute states explicitly that a foreign state is absolutely immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless a specific FSIA statutory exemption is applicable. The only exemption potentially available to those whose property has been confiscated is 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3), which denies immunity in cases “in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue.” The Eleventh and D.C. Circuits agreed that the availability of the § 1605(a)(3) exemption depends to a large extent on whether the plaintiff is a citizen of the foreign state; if so, federal courts are far less willing to exercise jurisdiction. Continue reading
This video explains why Laura and Marvin Horne have taken their case that a U.S. Department of Agriculture marketing program violates the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution all the way to the Supreme Court.
Washington Legal Foundation filed an amicus brief in Horne v. USDA supporting the farmers’ argument that the program’s seizure of raisin crops without compensation is an unconstitutional taking. The Court heard oral arguments in the case on April 22. On the afternoon of the argument, WLF held a Web Seminar program assessing the arguments, which featured one of the Hornes’ attorneys, Stephen Schwartz. A video of the program can be viewed here.
Attorney Thomas R. Fox, a prominent Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) practitioner and author of a forthcoming WLF Legal Opinion Letter, “Is SEC Heading toward a Strict Liability Application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act?,” recently interviewed WLF Legal Studies Division Chief Counsel, Glenn Lammi, about WLF’s public interest work and our focus on the FCPA.
Episode 151-Glenn Lammi, Washington Legal Foundation.
Featured Expert Column – Antitrust/Federal Trade Commission
Andrea Agathoklis Murino, Goodwin Proctor LLP
Many months ago, I wrote about the ongoing saga that was the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) attempt to unwind the acquisition of Palmyra Park Hospital (“Palmyra”) by Phoebe Putney Health System Inc. (“Phoebe”) in Albany, Georgia. There were visits to all three levels of the federal court system (yes, even the Supremes!), as well as unexpected detours through various Georgia regulatory bodies. With the FTC’s announcement late last month that it was settling its administrative litigation with a behavioral remedy, we now know how this story ends.
Where We’ve Been
This journey began back in early-2011 with the FTC’s attempt to block the deal outright on the grounds that the combined entity would have had market shares in excess of 85% in the provision of acute care services in a six-county region. The FTC initially secured a preliminary injunction at the district court level but Phoebe successfully argued that despite the concentration levels, its acquisition was legal under the state action doctrine. The state action doctrine provides that where (1) there is a clearly articulated state policy to displace competition and (2) there is active supervision by the state of the policy or activity, otherwise anticompetitive activity will be permitted. Here, Phoebe argued the acquisition was immune under both prongs of the test because it was owned by the Hospital Authority of Albany-Dougherty County, and operated under Georgia’s Hospital Authorities Law.
On April 1—no joke—the Consumer Product Safety Commission’s troubling new standard for magnet sets was slated to go into effect. However, thanks to the efforts of the sole remaining distributor of Small Rare Earth Magnets (SREMs) in the United States, Zen Magnets LLC, consumer freedom won a last-minute reprieve.
As companies wishing to challenge final rules of federal agencies may typically do, Zen Magnets filed a stay of enforcement directly in the U.S. Court of Appeals covering its home state, Colorado in this case. In rapid response to Zen Magnets LLC’s motion for a stay, the Tenth Circuit issued a same-day order to temporarily “stay the enforcement and effect of the Safety Standard for Magnet Sets promulgated by respondent Consumer Product Safety Commission on October 3, 2014, which goes into effect on April 1, 2015.” In addition, the Court ordered CPSC to file a brief in response on or before today (April 14) “to assist the court in its review of the motion.”
Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court had to consider four factors in issuing the motion to stay: likelihood of success on the merits; threat of irreparable harm; absence of harm to the government; and risk of harm to the public interest. Just because the Tenth Circuit has issued the stay does not mean that it has decided the motion to stay enforcement will succeed. Still, if the Court were convinced that the arguments Zen Magnets has presented in opposition to the Magnet Safety Standard were frivolous or had little chance to prevail, it is unlikely the Court would have issued even a temporary stay. Since the appeals court’s review marks the first time any entity outside the agency’s purview has had an opportunity to check CPSC’s work, it is encouraging to see the Tenth Circuit forcing the agency to explain its unprecedented actions here. Continue reading
Since its release in late February, the White House’s “Discussion Draft: Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015” has drawn a significant amount of friendly fire from privacy activists and even federal privacy regulators. Their criticism insinuates that the Discussion Draft is at best a floor, a starting point for more stringent regulation. That perspective should be quite troubling to those who work in and benefit from the Internet Economy, for as we discuss below, certain aspects of the draft impose burdens on data use that far outpace any that currently prevail or have been proposed at the federal level.
“Privacy Risk.” The data rights and protections the Discussion Draft affords are predicated on consumers suffering a “privacy risk” harm. That harm is defined as “the potential for personal data, on its own or when linked to other information about an individual, to cause emotional distress, or physical, financial, professional or other harm to an individual” (our emphasis). This definition would enshrine into federal law broad, amorphous, and precautionary concepts of harm that are radically out of step with prevailing law. For instance, federal courts have almost uniformly rejected data-privacy-related class-action lawsuits where the injuries alleged reflect plaintiffs’ fears of financial harm or emotional concerns. One very recent example is a Middle District of Pennsylvania ruling, Storm v. Paytime, Inc. and Holt v. Paytime Harrisburg, Inc., in which the court found that plaintiffs who cannot allege harms that are “concrete in both a qualitative and temporal sense” lack standing to sue. An alleged injury that provides the basis for a federal law enforcement action should certainly be no less concrete. Some activists, however, view “privacy risk” as too difficult for consumers or regulators to prove and have called for an even broader concept of injury. Continue reading