Featured Expert Contributor – Intellectual Property (Patents)
Jeffri A. Kaminski, Venable LLP
The recent Federal Circuit decision in Ultramercial v. Wild Tangent continues the trend of courts invalidating software and business method patents made vulnerable by the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International. The Ultramercial decision also continues the wave of “patent reform” in the courts, at the Patent Office, and in Congress. Software and business method patent owners and applicants should be concerned by these recent developments, and alleged infringers should be encouraged. The concurring opinion by Judge Mayer describes how an early determination of patent eligibility during litigation may help stem “[t]he scourge of meritless infringement claims [that] has continued unabated for decades.”
The Federal Circuit invalidated Ultramercial’s patent as being directed to an abstract idea, which is not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The asserted patent, U.S. Patent No. 7,346,545 (“the ’545 Patent”), is optimistically titled, “Method and system for payment of intellectual property royalties by interposed sponsor on behalf of consumer over a telecommunications network.” The main patent claim includes eleven specific steps for displaying an advertisement in exchange for access to copyrighted media. However, the appellate court determined that the patent “describes only the abstract idea of showing an advertisement before delivering free content” and is therefore invalid.
In spite of the eleven steps enumerated in the method claim, the court held that merely adding additional routine steps to an abstract idea “does not transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.” Furthermore, although the claims of the ’545 Patent were tied to a general purpose computer, “adding a computer to otherwise conventional steps does not make an invention patent-eligible” either. Continue reading
This November 10, 2014 WLF Media Briefing, Toward Patent Non-Aggression: Market-Based Approaches to Deterring Legal Risks and Neutralizing Litigation, featured presentations by three innovators whose ideas are minimizing operating companies’ exposure to abusive patent lawsuits:
- Keith Bergelt, CEO of the Open Invention Network;
- Kevin Jakel, CEO of Unified Patents, Inc.; and
- Tim Kowalski, Senior Patent Counsel to Google Inc. and Director, License on Transfer Network
Our speakers make reference to PowerPoint slides, which can be downloaded here.
If you would prefer to watch the presentation in higher resolution video where you can view the slides synched with the presentations, WLF has posted it in its online archive of on-demand videos here.
Featured Expert Column – Antitrust/Federal Trade Commission
Andrea Agathoklis Murino, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati
Consolidation in the health care industry, and the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC” or “Commission”) perspective on such activity, are being closely watched in antitrust law and policy circles. In April 2011, the FTC challenged the acquisition of Palmyra Park Hospital by Phoebe Putney Health System Inc. (“Phoebe”) in Albany, Georgia. The Commission argued that the combination would result in unduly high market shares (>85%) in the provision of acute care services in a six-county region and result in anticompetitive price increases. Shortly thereafter, the FTC sought and obtained a preliminary injunction (“PI”) from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia halting the transaction pending trial. Typical enough. But here’s where our story starts to take some strange twists. What began that April in a federal district court is an adventure leading from the Supreme Court to local Georgia healthcare regulatory bodies…and possibly, back again. Here’s what happened.
Phoebe responded to the PI not by throwing itself into a trial on the merits, but rather by filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds that by virtue of the state action doctrine, Phoebe’s conduct was permissible. Generally, the state action doctrine provides that where (1) there is a clearly articulated state policy to displace competition and (2) there is active supervision by the state of the policy or activity, otherwise anticompetitive activity will be permitted. Here, Phoebe argued that because it was owned by the Hospital Authority of Albany-Dougherty County, and operated under Georgia’s Hospital Authorities Law, it was immune. Phoebe prevailed on its motion to dismiss in the district court and then again at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Phoebe then completed its purchase of Palmyra, closing the transaction. Continue reading
Douglas W. Greene and Claire Loebs Davis, Lane Powell LLP
On November 3, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Laborers District Counsel Construction Industry Pension Fund v. Omnicare, Inc., which concerns the standard for judging the falsity of an opinion challenged in an action under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. In the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decision under review (“2013 Omnicare decision”), the court held that a statement of opinion can be “false” even if the speaker genuinely believed the stated opinion. This holding is contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, which held that a statement of opinion is a factual statement as to what the speaker believes—meaning a statement of opinion is “true” as long as the speaker genuinely believes the opinion expressed, i.e., if it is “subjectively” true.
We authored an amicus brief on a pro bono basis for Washington Legal Foundation (“WLF”) in Omnicare that emphasizes the importance of clarifying the standard for challenging “false” statements of opinion under all the federal securities laws, not just Section 11. WLF’s view that such clarification is needed was reinforced by an October 10, 2014 decision in a subsequently filed securities class action against Omnicare under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig. (“2014 Omnicare decision”). In the 2014 Omnicare decision, the Sixth Circuit appeared to embrace the proposition that a statement of opinion is not actionable if it is subjectively true—at least under Section 10(b)—but then held that the subjective falsity inquiry should be analyzed within the element of scienter. The opinion reflects the continued confusion that pervades analysis of this issue, jumbling subjective falsity with other concepts, and conflating the separate elements of falsity and scienter.
As part of its scienter analysis, the Sixth Circuit also grappled with another important question: whose state of mind counts for purposes of determining a corporation’s scienter? Although the Sixth Circuit believes the standard it enunciated constitutes a “middle ground” between restrictive and liberal tests among the federal circuit courts, its ruling misunderstands the nature of the scienter inquiry and conflicts with the Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, and thus risks expanding corporate liability beyond the proper reach of Section 10(b).
After discussing the proper analysis of statements of opinion, and explaining errors in the 2013 Omnicare decision, we explain and analyze both holdings in the 2014 Omnicare decision. Continue reading
Featured Expert Contributor – Intellectual Property (Patents)
Jeffri A. Kaminski, Venable LLP, with Briana Rizzo,* Venable LLP
*Editor’s Note: With this post we welcome the participation in The WLF Legal Pulse of Featured Expert Contributor on patent litigation and policy issues, Jeffri Kaminski.
The Delaware District Court, historically known as a venue friendly to patent holders, appears ready to fight back against the litigation strategies of Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), or “patent trolls.” While the court has traditionally disfavored imposing fees and sanctions on unsuccessful Plaintiffs , several recent cases signal a major shift in the judicial perspective on what District Court Judge Richard G. Andrews calls “misleading and prejudicial” tactics.  Most notably, Parallel Iron LLC v. NetApp Inc. and Summit Data Systems, LLC v. EMC Corporation et al solidify a growing trend in the Delaware Circuit of both judicial discontent with PAE litigation tactics and a willingness to sanction such behavior.
A trend on the rise
The U.S. Supreme Court released its groundbreaking Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. decision on April 29, 2014, lowering the standard of 35 U.S.C. § 285 “exceptional” behavior and enabling prevailing parties to obtain attorneys’ fees for behavior that merely “stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position […] or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.” While several cases immediately following Octane Fitness retained a traditional refusal to award fees, on September 12, 2014, Judge Andrews released three pro-defendant opinions on the matter, the most significant being Parallel Iron LLC v. NetApp Inc. Continue reading
Featured Expert Contributor – Antitrust & Competition, U.S. Department of Justice
Mark J. Botti, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP with Anthony W. Swisher, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
*Editor’s Note: With this post we welcome the participation in The WLF Legal Pulse of Featured Expert Contributor on Justice Department-related competition law and policy matters, Mark Botti. Mark is co-leader of Squire Patton Boggs’s Global Antitrust & Competition Practice Group and previously spent 13 years at DOJ’s Antitrust Division.
In 2001, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) declined to block the proposed merger of General Electric and Honeywell, allowing the deal to proceed with certain limited divestitures. Announced in October of 2000, that deal would bring together two significant players in a number of related market segments, including aircraft engines, avionics, and landing gear. Despite DOJ’s decision not to block the deal outright, the European Union reached a different result, forbidding the transaction under a “conglomerate merger” theory that has long been out of favor in the United States and has drawn significant criticism in the economic and legal literature.
These diverging enforcement decisions spawned a wave of criticism directed at both jurisdictions. How were multinational businesses in a global economy to order their affairs in the face of such conflicting enforcement theories and outcomes? Were they facing a “race to the bottom,” where the most aggressive enforcers effectively held a veto over the decisions of other competition agencies? Continue reading
Yesterday, a World Trade Organization (WTO) compliance panel publicly released its determination that the United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) country of origin labeling rule for certain cuts of muscle meat violated the international Technical Barriers to Trade agreement. Canada had sought such a determination, supported by other nations such as Argentina, Australia, and Japan.
News reports on this decision caught The WLF Legal Pulse‘s attention because U.S. meat producers had challenged the so-called COOL rule under the First Amendment in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. A number of posts (here and here) assessed the court’s July 29 en banc decision rejecting the producers’ challenge.
As we argued in the August 25 post, the majority improperly assisted the government by identifying the substantial government interests that the USDA rule advanced, including the protection of domestic farmers from foreign competition. Because of the pending proceedings at the WTO, the U.S. government had formally denied that protectionism was one of the goals of its COOL regulation.
The meat producers have asked the D.C. Circuit to reconsider its en banc holding, a motion on which the court has yet to rule. It is uncertain what impact the WTO determination will have on that request.