Education and Information Sharing: Underutilized Tools in FTC’s Data Security Work

150px-US-FederalTradeCommission-Seal.svgThe Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has brought 52 enforcement actions involving data breaches. Fifty of those businesses, whose computer systems were illegally accessed by hackers, settled rather than fight FTC’s accusations that they acted “deceptively” or “unfairly” under § 5 of the FTC Act. And yet, the data breaches just keep on coming, with unlawful intrusions on Home Depot’s payment-card processing system and the federal HealthCare.gov website occurring just this past week. It’s high time the Commission utilized tools at its disposal aside from the enforcement hammer to address data security.

WLF is not the only organization advancing this notion. On March 25, 2014, Consumer Action, Consumer Federation of America, National Consumer League, and the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse wrote FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, asking the Commission to “convene a public forum, bringing stakeholders together to discuss strategies for combating the growing threat of data breaches.”

FTC Commissioners routinely note in public statements that in addition to enforcement and advocacy, the Commission protects consumers and competition through education and information sharing. Public forums, workshops, and other events of the type the consumer groups sought in their letter have long been an integral part of FTC’s “educate and inform” function. Such events educate not only the public, but also the Commission and its staff. Continue reading

High Court Presented with Opportunity to Reinforce its Compelled Speech Jurisprudence

first-amendmentA petition for writ of certiorari filed with the U.S. Supreme Court on July 17 (the respondent’s reply is still pending) may provide the justices with a timely opportunity to clarify the Court’s jurisprudence on compelled speech. The case, Anthem Prescription Management v. Beeman, involves the increasingly common practice by government of enlisting private enterprises to communicate certain messages against their will. As we have discussed here recently, the lower federal courts are fractured over the amount of First Amendment scrutiny judges should apply when businesses challenge such speech mandates.

Laws Correcting Deception. Beginning with Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel in 1985, the Supreme Court has developed a consistent jurisprudence on compelled speech for commercial enterprises. Zauderer recognized businesses’ First Amendment rights to communicate with consumers about their products. But the Court noted that such protection is minimal for misleading or false commercial speech. It held that “an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.” The Court emphasized that the speech mandate must require “purely factual and uncontroversial information” and not be “unduly burdensome.”

Laws Not Targeting Deception. What if the government interest underlying a speech mandate is not correction of deception? In our opinion, the Court spoke quite clearly in Zauderer, carving out prevention of deception as a unique exception to the First Amendment’s heightened protection of commercial speech, and thus heightened scrutiny should still apply to other speech mandates. Continue reading

Missouri Supreme Court Invalidates State’s Legislative Cap on Punitive Damages

Behrens_MGuest Commentary

by Mark A. Behrens, Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.*

On September 9, the Supreme Court of Missouri struck down the state’s legislative limit on the amount of punitive damages that can be imposed on defendants. Under the cap, punitive damages could not exceed the greater of $500,000 or five times the net amount of the judgment. Lewellen v. Franklin arose from an unremarkable fraudulent misrepresentation and unlawful merchandising suit. In finding that the statutory damages cap violated Lewellen’s right to a jury trial, the Court followed a 2012 decision invalidating the state’s cap on non-economic damages in medical liability cases, Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers.

This holding is an extreme outlier.  Virtually every other state court that has considered the constitutionality of punitive damages caps has held that such laws do not violate the jury trial right because the jury’s fact-finding function is preserved.  The jury continues to resolve disputed facts with respect to liability and assessment of legally available remedies.  Once the jury has decided these issues, the constitutional mandate is met—or at least is virtually every other state in the country.  Nationally, both state and federal courts consistently have upheld the constitutionality of punitive damages caps. Continue reading

Federal Appeals Courts Reject Clean Water Act “Permit Shield” Defense

sboxermanFeatured Expert Column – Environmental Law and Policy

by Samuel B. Boxerman, Sidley Austin LLP with Katharine Falahee Newman, Sidley Austin LLP

In the past two months, two federal circuit courts examined the extent of the Clean Water Act’s (“CWA”) “permit shield” defense and reached similar conclusions—the defense cannot be used by a party that does not completely fulfil certain National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, or permit application, obligations. Permit holders and applicants should be wary of the risk presented by this emerging case law, as the decisions could open the door to increased enforcement, unless an applicant has provided to the permitting authority a wide range of data regarding its discharge during the application process.

Generally, the CWA shields a permit holder from liability if the party possesses or has applied for an NPDES permit through the appropriate federal and state regulatory framework. The permit shield states that “compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this section shall be deemed compliance,” see 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k). The shield protects permit holders from challenges that their permits are not sufficiently stringent as well as actions to compel the permit holder to change its operations following changes to CWA regulations. Continue reading

FDA’s “Added Sugar” Labeling Proposal: More Information Isn’t Always Better (or Legal)

FDA's proposed Nutrition Facts format

FDA’s proposed Nutrition Facts format

The Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) proposed addition of “added sugars” to the mandatory Nutrition Facts label on packaged food lacks scientific justification, is more likely to confuse than inform consumers, and will expose the agency to a constitutional challenge. So why is FDA pushing forward with this counterproductive idea?

___________________

In announcing proposed changes to the 20-year old “Nutrition Facts” label, FDA reminded us that the purpose of the ubiquitous label is to “help[] consumers make informed food choices and maintain healthy dietary practices.” The update ostensibly would provide, among other improvements, “greater understanding of nutrition science.” However, one of the update’s most highly touted additions—a new line item for “Added Sugars,” triple-indented under “Carbohydrates” and “Total Sugars”— thoroughly fails to achieve these stated goals and contradicts current nutrition science.

Uninformative. If the Nutrition Facts label exists to “help consumers to make informed food choices,” then shouldn’t FDA be certain that listing added sugars would in fact be helpful? The agency, though, acknowledges in its March 3 proposal that it is “not aware of any existing consumer research that has examined this topic.

One public comment provided to FDA did offer consumer research, and the data thoroughly undercuts the “Added Sugars” proposal. The International Food Information Council (IFIC) Foundation conducted a consumer survey that conformed to OMB requirements for government research. The results revealed confusion among surveyed consumers over the meaning of “Added Sugars.” More than half of respondents believed that Added Sugars were different from the sugars included in “Total Sugars.” A substantial number believed that instead of being a part of the Total Sugars figure, Added Sugars should be added to Total Sugars. Consider, for instance, a bottle of sweetened iced tea, which is currently labeled to contain 22 grams of sugar per serving.  None of the sugar is naturally occurring. If the proposed Nutrition Facts label is adopted in its entirety, consumers might look at the 22 grams of Total Sugars, and the 22 grams of Added Sugars, and conclude that the tea contains 44 grams per serving. In addition, the survey found that a majority of consumers felt that products listing added sugars contained more sugar than was actually present, a perception that would affect their purchasing decisions.

An agency whose mission is consumer protection must not mandate confusing or misleading label information. FDA should take heed of the IFIC Foundation research and do what it should have done from the start: study the issue before mandating that Added Sugars be listed. Continue reading

Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Argentina Continues to Stiff its Creditors

ArgentinaEver since its final courtroom defeat earlier this summer in its long-running battle with holdout bondholders, Argentina has attempted to portray itself as a responsible debtor that wants to pay all legitimate obligations. The Kirschner regime claims that its July 2014 default on the nation’s bond repayment obligations was forced upon it involuntarily by U.S. District Judge Thomas Griesa. Argentina asserts that it wants to act responsibly by making interest payments on its external indebtedness and would do so but for the injunction issued by “crazy old Judge Griesa” at the request of holdout bondholders (or, as Argentina refers to them, “vulture funds”). But Argentina’s recent actions don’t match its rhetoric; it continues its well-established policy of refusing to pay obligations that it has no plausible basis for contesting. Argentina has expressed a desire to repair its tarnished reputation within financial markets, but nothing in its recent conduct suggests movement in that direction.

A good case in point is Republic of Argentina v. BG Group PLC, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court earlier this year. That case involved claims by BG Group, a British natural gas company, that Argentina had breached a contract by taking steps designed to drive BG Group out of business. In 2007, an international arbitration panel unanimously agreed and entered a $185 million judgment in favor of BG Group. Rather than paying the judgment, Argentina sought to appeal the arbitration award within the U.S. court system. After years of protracted litigation, the Supreme Court in March 2014 upheld the arbitration award. Continue reading

D.C. Circuit’s “COOL” Decision Eases Government’s Burden in Justifying Compelled Speech

DC CircuitIf government wants to force you to say something you would not otherwise express, it must have a very good reason for doing so. This bedrock First Amendment principle applies to individuals and business enterprises alike.

In July, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit—arguably the nation’s second most important federal court—carved away at this principle and the constitutional protection it provides. Below, we discuss how that court allowed a federal agency to repeatedly change its declared reason for compelling speech and in an en banc panel opinion improperly eased government’s burden to prove a substantial governmental interest.

District Court Challenge. The compelled speech at issue in American Meat Institute (AMI) v. USDA is a country of origin label (“COOL”) recording the place of birth, residence, and slaughter of the animal from which each cut of meat taken. In the proposed rule’s Statement of Benefits and Costs, USDA asserted the mandate was justified because “certain U.S. consumers valued the designation.” AMI argued in its public comments that this interest was neither governmental nor substantial. USDA responded in the final rule with a stunning tautology: our interest is substantial and governmental because Congress empowered us to impose the COOL mandate.

When AMI sued to enjoin COOL on July 25, 2013, the agency again shifted focus, advancing a new justification that never appeared in the administrative record: “correct misleading speech and prevent consumer deception.” The federal district court bought USDA’s made-for-litigation governmental interest while denying AMI’s motion. In permitting this new justification, Judge Jackson ignored a 1947 Supreme Court precedent, SEC v. Chenery Corp. That decision holds that when judging the propriety of agency action, courts are limited to what is in the administrative record. Continue reading